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Bing Li
ESSAYS ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF FISCAL POLICY
BEHAVIOR
Abstract: The identification of fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization has
become of crucial practical importance. This dissertation studies two different ap-
proaches to identify such fiscal policy behavior. The first chapter shows that the cur-
rent limited-information approaches to identify such fiscal policy behavior, without
taking into account the intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC) of debt valuation
and the monetary policy, are, in general, subject to a simultaneity bias problem
and, therefore, the corresponding inferences on such fiscal policy behavior may be
misleading. The current approaches used include the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and the bivariate Vector
Autoregression (VAR). To correctly identify such fiscal policy behavior, the first
chapter proposes a simultaneous equations approach, which incorporates both the
IEC and the monetary policy and avoids the simultaneity bias problem a priori.
Based on the post-World War II U.S. data, the results show that the U.S. primary
surplus’ response to the state of government debt is, on average, much weaker than
those estimated by the OLS and GMM methods. More importantly, the estimated
response is statistically insignificant, which is completely different from the OLS
and GMM methods. The results also show that the contemporaneous response of
the U.S. total government liabilities to a positive surplus shock is not significantly
negative, which is in sharp contrast to the typical results of the bivariate VAR.
v
In the second chapter, it is recognized that the identification of such fiscal policy
behavior is a general equilibrium problem, which requires that monetary policy be-
havior always be considered simultaneously. Therefore, the second chapter takes a
holistic view and jointly identifies monetary and fiscal policy behavior for the U.S.
by estimating a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model with Bayesian meth-
ods. By applying Bayesian model comparison techniques to the U.S. Pre-Volcker
and Post-1982 samples, the second chapter finds out that (1) both samples favor
determinacy over indeterminacy; (2) active fiscal policy is not detected in either
sample. The findings are consistent with the previous literature for the Post-1982
sample, but not for the Pre-Volcker sample.
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Chapter 1
On the Identification of Fiscal
Policy Behavior
Abstract
The identification of fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization has become of cru-
cial practical importance. This paper shows that the current limited-information
approaches to identify such fiscal policy behavior, without taking into account the in-
tertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC) of debt valuation and the monetary policy,
are, in general, subject to a simultaneity bias problem and, therefore, the corre-
sponding inferences on such fiscal policy behavior may be misleading. The current
approaches used include the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) and the bivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR).
To correctly identify such fiscal policy behavior, this paper proposes a simultane-
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ous equations approach, which incorporates both the IEC and the monetary policy
and avoids the simultaneity bias problem a priori. Based on the post-World War
II U.S. data, the results show that the U.S. primary surplus’ response to the state
of the government debt is, on average, much weaker than those estimated by the
OLS and GMM methods. More importantly, the estimated response is statistically
insignificant, which is completely different from the OLS and GMM methods. The
results also show that the contemporaneous response of the U.S. total government
liabilities to a positive surplus shock is not significantly negative, which is in sharp
contrast to the typical results of the bivariate VAR.
1.1 Introduction
In the empirical macro literature, simple fiscal policy rules are often used to char-
acterize fiscal policy behavior, just as the Taylor rule being used to characterize
monetary policy behavior. In general, a simple fiscal policy rule can be expressed
as
τt = γbbt−1 + γ
′
ZZt + ψt (1.1)
in which τt is the primary surplus, bt−1 is the real value of lagged government debt,
Zt is a vector of other controlled variables, e.g. the output gap, and ψt is a fiscal
shock.
Recently, the identification of fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization1 has
1This paper only focuses on one aspect of fiscal policy behavior, i.e., the fiscal authority’s stance
on debt stabilization. The other aspects of fiscal policy behavior, such as the fiscal authority’s
2
become of crucial practical importance. One typical example is that, by identifying
such fiscal policy behavior, people are able to draw inferences on the sources of fiscal
financing in the U.S. that have kept the U.S. debt to GDP ratio from exploding in
the past several decades, as depicted in Figure 1.1. In practice, several ways exist as
to how to make the identification, depending on what estimation strategy is used.
One typical strategy is to estimate a single-equation fiscal policy rule similar to (1.1)
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression or the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) and then draw inferences based on the estimated coefficient of the
lagged government debt. Another strategy is to embed a fiscal policy rule similar
to (1.1) into a bivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR) and draw inferences based on
the impulse response functions2.
However, the results of this paper show that methods such as the OLS, GMM and
bivariate VAR are, in general, subject to a simultaneity bias problem and, therefore,
the corresponding inferences on the fiscal policy behavior may be misleading. To
understand the nature of the problem, the key is the intertemporal equilibrium
condition (IEC)3 of debt valuation that holds in the general equilibrium of any
macro economy regardless of the policy behavior in place. Generally, an IEC is
stance on economic stabilization, are not studied in this paper.
2Since these methods only utilize partial information from the whole economic structure, I label
them the limited-information approaches. Typical examples include Bohn (1998) for the OLS,
Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Claeys (2006, 2008) for the GMM and Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2001, 2002) and Creel and Bihan (2006) for the bivariate VAR. There is another
line of research in the recent literature that utilizes all the information of the economic structure
to identify fiscal policy behavior. I label this literature the full-information approach. Typical
examples include Caivano (2007), Leeper, Plante and Traum (2009) and Li (2010b), among others.
Note, this paper only studies the limited-information approaches.
3This terminology follows Leeper (2009). It is also called the ”intertemporal government budget
constraint” in the literature, especially by opponents of the fiscal theory of the price level.
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expressed as
Real Market Value of Government Debt =
Expected Present Value of Future Primary Surpluses + Seigniorage (1.2)
in which
Primary Surpluses = Total Revenues
−Government Consumption & Investment−Government Transfer Payments
From the IEC, it is clear that the real value of government debt, which is intrinsically
determined by the joint processes of future monetary and fiscal policy behavior, is
forward-looking in nature. Therefore, fiscal policy rules similar to (1.1) should
always be estimated along with the IEC and the monetary policy rules. However,
all of the aforementioned methods fail to do so, which results in the simultaneity
bias problem.
The first contribution of this paper is the analytical illustration of the simultane-
ity bias problem associated with the OLS regression within a simple DSGE model.
A few results are worth emphasizing here. First, the simultaneity bias problem
associated with the OLS regression is prevailing in the parameter space. Specifi-
cally, with passive monetary policy (PM)4 and active fiscal policy (AF) in place,
the simultaneity bias can be either negative or positive, depending on the particu-
4According to Leeper’s (1991) terminology, monetary policy is passive when the interest rate
responds to inflation at a value of less than one-for-one and active when the response is at a
value of more than one-for-one. Fiscal policy is passive when the tax responds to the outstanding
government debt strongly and active otherwise. According to Woodford’s (1995) terminology, an
equilibrium is called non-Ricardian when the monetary policy is passive and the fiscal policy is
active. Symmetrically, an equilibrium is called Ricardian when the monetary policy is active and
the fiscal policy is passive.
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lar parameterization. With active monetary policy (AM) and passive fiscal policy
(PF) in place, the simultaneity bias is always negative. Second, the severity of the
simultaneity bias problem associated with the OLS regression is related to the un-
derlying monetary policy behavior. In particular, an active fiscal policy is very hard
to identify using the OLS regression when the monetary policy is passive5.
As a second contribution, the results show that simply adding lags of the primary
surplus to a fiscal policy rule as explanatory variables does not necessarily soak up
the serial correlation in the fiscal shock, which is sufficient for the simultaneity bias
problem. Even when it soaks up the serial correlation, the lagged government debt
is still likely to forecast future fiscal shocks and primary surpluses. In either case,
the simultaneity bias problem is inevitable. Therefore, modeling fiscal policy inertia
by including lagged surpluses in a fiscal policy rule is not a robust solution to the
simultaneity bias problem.
To solve the simultaneity bias problem fundamentally, this paper proposes a si-
multaneous equations approach, which incorporates both the IEC and the monetary
policy and forms the third contribution. Following the methodology advocated in
Chung and Leeper (2009), the cross-equation restrictions implied by the IEC are
imposed on an identified VAR that includes both the monetary and the fiscal policy
rules. Based on the post-World War II U.S. data, the results show that the response
of the U.S. primary surplus to the state of government debt is, on average, much
weaker than those estimated by the OLS and GMM methods. More importantly,
5To some extent, this may explain why the empirical literature of the U.S. fiscal policy behavior
using the OLS regression (e.g., Bohn (1998)) rarely finds significant evidence favoring the fiscal
theory of the price level (i.e., PM/AF).
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the estimated response is statistically insignificant, which is completely different
from the OLS and GMM methods. The results also show that the contemporane-
ous response of the U.S. total government liabilities to a positive surplus shock is
not significantly negative, which is in sharp contrast to the typical results of the
bivariate VAR.
1.2 Related Literature
Depending on different estimation strategy, the current literature of identifying fiscal
authority’s stance on debt stabilization can be categorized into limited-information
approach and full-information approach. This section provides a review of the re-
lated literature.
As the simplest limited-information approach, Bohn (1998) estimates a fiscal pol-
icy rule as following by the OLS regression based on the U.S. annual data.
τt = ρ · bt−1 + α0 + αG ·GV ARt + αY · Y V ARt + t (1.3)
in which τt is the ratio of primary surplus (taxes minus noninterest spending) to
GDP, bt−1 is the ratio of (start-of-period) debt to GDP, GV ARt is the level of
temporary government spending and Y V ARt is a business cycle indicator. The
benchmark regression in Bohn (1998) is based on the sample from 1916 to 1995.
Depending on different subperiods used in the estimation, Bohn (1998) obtains
estimates of ρ all between 2.8 and 5.4 percent and argues that the estimates are
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all significantly positive and quantitatively reasonable. In conclusion, Bohn (1998)
states that the U.S. government has been systematically responding to the state of
government debt and so the U.S. fiscal policy is sustainable. As well known, the
OLS estimate of ρ is consistent only if bt−1 is orthogonal to t. This assumption
seems to be “justifiable” because bt−1 is predetermined relative to t. However, this
paper illustrates that the orthogonality assumption is not generally valid because
the government debt is forward-looking in nature. With serially correlated fiscal
shocks, it can be shown that the lagged government debt forecasts future fiscal
shocks, causing the simultaneity bias problem and leaving the OLS-based inferences
unreliable6.
As a generalization of the simple fiscal policy rules similar to (1.1), some people
introduce policy inertia to the fiscal policy rules by adding lagged primary surpluses
as explanatory variables7. This, as they argue, is according to the institutional fea-
ture of fiscal policy, i.e. the fiscal policy instruments adjust only gradually towards
their targets. It is shown in this paper that a serially correlated fiscal shock is suf-
ficient for the lagged government debt to forecast future fiscal shocks, which causes
the simultaneity bias problem. People in this literature usually argue that the inclu-
sion of lagged surpluses is able to soak up the serial correlation in the fiscal shock.
Therefore, they consider the fiscal shock as unforecastable and the simultaneity bias
problem as avoided. In practice, one typical approach is to estimate a linear fiscal
6Similar comments on Bohn (1998)’s OLS regression have been made by Cochrane (1998),
Woodford (1998, 2001), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) and Davig, Leeper and Chung (2007),
among others.
7Typical examples include Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003), Gal´ı and Perotti (2003),
Claeys (2006, 2008) and Daniel and Shiamptanis (2008), among others.
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policy rule by the instrumental variable (IV) regression, e.g. Gal´ı and Perotti (2003).
Instrumental variables are usually used for the contemporaneous output gap, which
is considered as endogenous and included to capture the fiscal authority’s stance on
economic stabilization. The lagged government debt is generally not instrumented
because it is assumed to be orthogonal to the fiscal shock. Another typical approach
is to estimate a nonlinear fiscal policy rule by the GMM method, e.g. Ballabriga
and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Claeys (2006, 2008). Since the lagged government
debt is assumed to be orthogonal to the fiscal shock, it is usually included in the set
of instrumental variables. For example, Claeys (2006) estimates the following fiscal
policy rule for the G-3 and large European countries.
τt = ρτt−1 + (1− ρ) [δ + γxt + βpit + ωit + θbt−1] + εt (1.4)
in which τt is the primary surplus (net taxes minus noninterest spending), xt is the
output gap, pit is the inflation rate, it is the short-term nominal interest rate and bt−1
is the lagged government debt. By treating bt−1 as an instrumental variable, Claeys
(2006) estimates the fiscal policy rule for the U.S. based on the annual data from 1964
to 2003. The estimate of θ, which is the long-run response of the primary surplus
to the lagged government debt, is 0.05 and is significantly positive. In conclusion,
Claeys (2006) confirms the qualitative result of Bohn (1998) and argues that U.S.
fiscal policy is sustainable or Ricardian. However, this paper illustrates that simply
adding lagged surpluses to the fiscal policy rule does not necessarily soak up the
serial correlation in the fiscal shock. Even when it soaks up the serial correlation
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in the fiscal shock, the lagged government debt is still likely to forecast future fiscal
shocks. In either case, the orthogonality condition for the lagged government debt
and future fiscal shock is invalid and the simultaneity bias problem is inevitable,
which undermines the reliability of the inferences drawn by the IV and the GMM
methods.
Other than the OLS, IV and GMM methods, which belong to the single-equation
framework, some people in the literature fit a simple fiscal policy rule similar to (1.1)
in a bivariate VAR and draw inferences based on the impulse response functions8.
For example, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) estimate and identify a bivariate
VAR with the primary surplus to GDP ratio and the total government liabilities
(sum the net federal debt and the money base) to GDP ratio based on the U.S.
annual data from 1951 to 1995. In their Figure 3 on page 1228, they report that a
positive shock to the surplus is followed by a persistent decline in the government
liabilities. Since the surplus seems to retire the government liabilities, they conclude
that a Ricardian interpretation of the U.S. data is “more plausible” than a non-
Ricardian one. However, this paper argues that the simultaneity bias problem found
in the single-equation framework may also affect the bivariate VAR, because the
latter method involves equation-by-equation regressions.
For the full-information approach, there is a line of research in the recent literature
that identifies fiscal policy behavior by directly estimating a full-blown dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, in which simple fiscal policy rules are
8Typical examples include Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001, 2002) and Creel and Bihan
(2006), among others.
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clearly specified. For example, Caivano (2007), Leeper, Plante and Traum (2009)
and Li (2010b) apply the Bayesian methods to estimate DSGE models based on
the U.S. data. By this means, they get estimated simple fiscal policy rules. As an
advantage, the full-information approach incorporates the IEC and the monetary
policy9 intrinsically. So it is free of the simultaneity bias problem being examined
in this paper. As a caveat, the estimated DSGE model is often too stylized, which
implies that the full-information approach is not robust to the potential model
misspecification.
To correctly identify fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization, this paper pro-
poses a simultaneous equations approach by following the methodology advocated
in Chung and Leeper (2009). Specifically, the simultaneous equations approach im-
poses the cross-equation restrictions implied by the IEC on an identified VAR that
incorporates both the monetary and the fiscal policy rules and then estimates the
fiscal policy rules from the identified VAR. As a limited-information approach, the
proposed method is better than the others in the same kind because it takes both
the IEC and the monetary policy into account and, therefore, is free of the simul-
taneity bias problem a priori. On the other hand, it imposes the least amount of
economic structure in the estimation. So it is more robust to the potential model
misspecification than the full-information approach. To identify the structural VAR,
this paper also adopts the identification scheme that is proposed by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004). Based on the postwar U.S. data,
the simultaneous equations approach delivers results that are qualitatively different
9As an exception, Leeper, Plante and Traum (2009) estimates a standard RBC model that
does not have monetary policy.
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from the previous literature. Therefore, this paper concludes that the simultaneity
bias is an essential problem in the identification of fiscal policy behavior.
1.3 OLS Regression and the Simultaneity Bias:
An Analytical Investigation
In this section, I use a simple DSGE model similar to Leeper (1991, 2005) to illustrate
the simultaneity bias problem associated with the OLS regression. The findings are
twofold. First, the existence of simultaneity bias is generic, which can be positive or
negative over the parameter space. Second, the severity of simultaneity bias problem
is related to the underlying monetary policy behavior. The latter finding advocates
identifying fiscal policy jointly with monetary policy, which is supposed to deliver
more reliable inferences on fiscal policy behavior.
1.3.1 An Illustrative DSGE Model
Model Setup
This is an endowment economy model, in which an infinitely lived representative
agent chooses sequences {ct,Mt, Bt}∞t=0 to solve the household problem:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[ln(ct) + δln(Mt/Pt)] (1.5)
11
subject to the budget constraint
ct +
Mt +Bt
Pt
+ τt = y +
Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
(1.6)
taking the initial wealth M−1+R−1B−1 > 0 and sequences {y, τt, Rt, Pt}∞t=0 as given.
In (1.5) and (1.6), β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, δ ∈ (0,∞) is the weight on real
money balance in the utility function, ct is the real consumption, Mt is the nominal
money balance, Bt is the nominal one-period government debt with gross nominal
interest rate Rt, Pt is the price level, y is the endowment that is assumed to be
constant and τt is the lump-sum taxes (if positive) or transfers (if negative).
There is a government choosing policy sequences {Mt, Bt, τt}∞t=0 subject to the
government budget constraint
Mt +Bt
Pt
+ τt = gt +
Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
(1.7)
in which gt is the real government spending.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
ct + gt = y (1.8)
For simplicity, I assume gt = 0 for all t. So τt represents the primary surplus (if
positive) or the primary deficit (if negative). Also, (1.8) reduces to ct = c = y,
which is the goods market clearing condition.
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The model is closed by specifying simple rules for monetary and fiscal policy behav-
ior, which determine the corresponding policy instruments. Specifically, monetary
policy is described by the Taylor-type interest rate rule
Rt = e
α0piαt θt (1.9)
in which pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate. Likewise, fiscal policy is described by
the tax rule
τt = e
γ0bγt−1ψt (1.10)
in which bt−1 ≡ Bt−1/Pt−1 is the real government debt. I assume that the exogenous
monetary and fiscal policy shocks θt and ψt have unit steady state values and their
logarithms follow AR(1) processes
ln(θt) = ρθln(θt−1) + εθt (1.11)
ln(ψt) = ρψln(ψt−1) + ε
ψ
t (1.12)
in which |ρθ| < 1 and |ρψ| < 1 are assumed for stationarity. The innovations to
both policy shocks, εθt and ε
ψ
t , are assumed to be random variables with zero means
and bounded support. Their standard deviations are σθ and σψ, respectively. I also
assume that εθt and ε
ψ
t are both serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated between each
other for all leads and lags10.
10Here I make a strong assumption that εθt and ε
ψ
t are mutually uncorrelated in order to separate
effects of different shocks in a clear manner, which makes the illustration more transparent. To
allow for nonzero cross-correlation between different policy shock innovations, even though more
realistic, makes the derivation more cumbersome but would not change the main results of this
paper significantly.
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Determinacy Regions
With the complete model setup, I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the
stationary steady state and then solve the linearized model11. As shown in Appendix
1.A.1, the determinacy of bounded equilibrium12 of the linearized system hinges on
(α, γ), the two parameters in the monetary and fiscal policy rules. Following Leeper
(1991, 2005), I characterize four different regions in the first quadrant of (α, γ)
space13, two of which indicate determinacy: (1) When α > 1 (AM) and γ > 1
(PF), the equilibrium is determinate; (2) When α < 1 (PM) and γ < 1 (AF), the
equilibrium is also determinate; (3) When α < 1 (PM) and γ > 1 (PF), bounded
equilibrium is indeterminate; (4) When α > 1 (AM) and γ < 1 (AF), bounded
equilibrium does not exist. For the rest of the paper, I only focus on the determinacy
regions, which are displayed in Figure 1.2.
1.3.2 OLS Regression and the Simultaneity Bias
For illustration, the DSGE model specified earlier is taken as the data-generating
process (DGP). Suppose an econometrician, as in Bohn (1998), tries to identify fiscal
authority’s stance on debt stabilization by running OLS regression on the simple
11See Appendix 1.A.1 for full description of the model solution.
12In this paper, I only focus on determinate bounded equilibrium. The earlier assumption that
random variables εθt and ε
ψ
t have bounded support forms a necessary condition for this.
13As to the determinacy regions in the (α, γ) space, I only focus on those in the first quadrant,
which are economically more meaningful than those in the other quadrants.
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fiscal policy rule, which, in log-linearized form, is given by
τˆt = γbˆt−1 + ψˆt (1.13)
in which xˆt denotes log deviation of the generic variable xt from its steady state
value x, i.e. xˆt ≡ ln(xt)− ln(x). To simplify the analysis, the econometrician is
assumed to know the correct functional form of the fiscal policy rule (1.13). From the
econometrician’s perspective, bˆt−1 is predetermined relative to ψˆt. Therefore, bˆt−1 is
considered as orthogonal to ψˆt and the OLS estimator of γ, i.e. γˆOLS, is considered
as “consistent”. Since (1.13) is a structural equation, the econometrician naturally
attaches behavioral interpretation to γˆOLS and thus identifies the underlying fiscal
policy behavior.
Mathematically, the probability limit of γˆOLS is
plimγˆOLS = γ +
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt)
var(bˆt−1)
(1.14)
in which cov(·, ·) and var(·) are the covariance and variance operators, respectively.
It is clear from (1.14) that γˆOLS is consistent only if the term cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt)/var(bˆt−1),
which is the slope coefficient in the regression of ψˆt on bˆt−1, is zero. In another word,
γˆOLS is inconsistent if past government debt forecasts future fiscal shocks. In this
section, I illustrate that past government debt does forecast future fiscal shocks
over a wide range of the parameter space of the illustrative model, with exceptions
only in some rare cases. This implies that γˆOLS is generally inconsistent and the
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corresponding identification of fiscal policy behavior may be unreliable. The key to
understand the subtle point lies in the fact that bˆt−1 is forward-looking in nature,
which is best demonstrated by the IEC that can be obtained by iterating (2.27)
forwards over B/P , taking expectation conditional on the information set at t − 1
and imposing the transversality condition from the household problem:
Bt−1
Pt−1
= Et−1
∞∑
j=0
(
j∏
k=0
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1
)[
τt+j +
Mt+j −Mt+j−1
Pt+j
]
(1.15)
The IEC (1.15) is a general equilibrium condition that always holds in equilibrium
regardless of the policy behavior in place. It basically says that, in equilibrium,
the real market value of government debt is always equal to the expected present
value of future primary surpluses, inclusive of seigniorage revenues. When past
government debt forecasts future fiscal shocks, the correlation between bˆt−1 and τˆt
not only reflects the dependence of τˆt on bˆt−1 through γ of the fiscal policy rule
but also carries the correlation between bˆt−1 and ψˆt that is captured by the IEC.
In equilibrium, these two parts of the correlation between bˆt−1 and τˆt hold in the
fiscal policy rule and the IEC simultaneously. Hence, if the econometrician isolates
the fiscal policy rule from the whole system of structural equations, particularly the
IEC, and projects τˆt on bˆt−1, the econometric model is misspecified and the OLS
estimator of γ is subject to simultaneity bias.
Next, I illustrate the nature of the simultaneity bias problem through four sim-
ple cases. The DGPs of the first three cases are characterized by PM/AF policy
combination and that of the last case is characterized by AM/PF.
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Case I (PM/AF): α = γ = ρθ = ρψ = 0
In this case, the nominal interest rate is pegged, the primary surplus is exogenous
and both the monetary and the fiscal shocks are serially uncorrelated. Under these
simplifying assumptions, I get
bˆt = β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)ε
θ
t (1.16)
in which, according to Appendix 1.A.1, ϕ1 ≡ m(αχ+1)/b+β−1, ϕ4 ≡ −mχ/b−β−1
and χ ≡ 1/(1 − R). Since ρψ = 0, I get ψˆt = εψt . Hence, the covariance term in
(1.14) can be shown as
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) = cov
[
β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)ε
θ
t−1, ε
ψ
t
]
= 0 (1.17)
The covariance is zero because of the assumption that εθt and ε
ψ
t are both serially
uncorrelated and uncorrelated between each other for all leads and lags. Putting in
another way, the only shock that impinges on bˆt−1 is the monetary shock εθt−1, which
is by assumption orthogonal to future fiscal shocks. Therefore, bˆt−1 is orthogonal
to ψˆt, i.e. government debt does not forecast future fiscal shocks. In consequence,
plimγˆOLS = γ and the OLS estimator of γ is free of simultaneity bias.
However, the assumption that ψˆt in the simple rule (1.13) has no serial corre-
lation is too restrictive and is not consistent with the existing empirical evidence.
Therefore, more realistic cases are explored as follows.
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Case II (PM/AF): α = γ = ρθ = 0, 0 < ρψ < 1
In this case, I keep the assumptions of case I except that fiscal policy shock ψˆt
becomes serially correlated. Under these assumptions, I get
bˆt = β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)θˆt +
[
(β−1 − 1)ρψ
β−1 − ρψ
]
ψˆt
= β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)ε
θ
t +
[
(β−1 − 1)ρψ
β−1 − ρψ
]
εψt
(1− ρψL) (1.18)
in which ψˆt ≡ εψt /(1−ρψL) and L is the lag operator. The covariance term in (1.14)
is then given by
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) = cov
[
β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)ε
θ
t−1 +
(β−1 − 1)ρψ
β−1 − ρψ
εψt−1
(1− ρψL) ,
εψt
(1− ρψL)
]
=
[
(β−1 − 1)ρψ
β−1 − ρψ
]
cov
[
εψt−1
(1− ρψL) ,
εψt
(1− ρψL)
]
=
[
(β−1 − 1)σ2ψ
β−1 − ρψ
] ∞∑
i=1
ρ2iψ
=
(β−1 − 1)ρ2ψσ2ψ
(β−1 − ρψ)(1− ρ2ψ)
> 0 (1.19)
It is obviously seen that the simultaneity bias would always be positive because
of the positive covariance, i.e. plimγˆOLS > γ. Hence, the OLS estimator of γ
is inconsistent. Even though the fiscal policy is assumed to be active (γ = 0),
asymptotically, γˆOLS may be significantly large under certain parameterizations so
that the econometrician may mistakenly identify the underlying fiscal policy as
passive.
To get more economic insight into the positive bias, suppose there is a surprise
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tax cut or negative surplus shock in period t − 1, i.e. εψt−1 < 0. Since 0 < ρψ < 1
and γ = 0, a negative surplus shock at t − 1 forecasts lower path of ψˆt+j or τˆt+j
(j ≥ 0). Because the ex-ante real interest rate is constant in this economy with fixed
endowment, the expected discount factor is constant. Hence, the expected present
value of future surpluses decreases. I label it the expected surplus effect. On the
other hand, the lower path of expected future taxes immediately raises demand for
goods via the wealth effect. With the constant supply of goods, inflation increases
on impact. However, the nominal interest rate is pegged and does not respond to
higher inflation, which in turn does not raise the expected inflation according to the
Fisher equation. So the expected present value of future seigniorage is unaffected.
In summary, bˆt−1 decreases due to the expected surplus effect. In this case, bˆt−1
forecasts smaller ψˆt and proves to be positively correlated with ψˆt, which results in
the positive simultaneity bias.
Case III (PM/AF): γ = ρθ = 0, 0 < α < 1, 0 < ρψ < 1
In this case, I keep the assumptions of case II except that the monetary authority
starts to respond to inflation when setting the nominal interest rate. The derivation
of cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) and var(bˆt−1) is shown in Appendix 1.A.2. From the algebraic deriva-
tion, it is not obvious to determine the sign of the simultaneity bias. For illustration
purpose, I instead evaluate the bias numerically over a grid in the (α, ρψ) space, in
which both parameters range from 0.01 to 0.99 with increments of 0.01. I normalize
the economy by setting y = 1. As assumed, γ and ρθ are both zeroes. The other
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parameters are calibrated to match the U.S. data14. First, β and δ are calibrated as
0.99 and 0.0007, respectively, to match the steady state quarterly nominal interest
rate 1.01 and the real money balance to GDP ratio 0.07. Second, γ0 is implicitly cal-
ibrated to match the steady state real government debt to GDP ratio 0.34. Finally,
σθ and σψ are calibrated from a Bayesian perspective. Specifically, I construct the
series of εθt and ε
ψ
t at each grid point based on (1.69), (1.74) and (1.77) in Appendix
1.A.1. At each grid point, I then get a unique pair of σθ and σψ that is consistent
with the U.S. data.
The left panel of Figure 1.3 displays the simultaneity bias over the grid, which is
calculated based on the analytical result in Appendix 1.A.2. For clarity, I provide the
associated contour plot in the right panel. Conditioning on the calibrated parameter
values, it is clear that the bias can be positive or negative15, depending on α and
ρψ. Obviously, with highly persistent fiscal policy shocks (large ρψ) and relatively
passive monetary policy (small α), the bias is positive. By keeping ρψ fixed and
increasing α, the bias becomes negative. Note, the negative bias is nonlinear in α,
which is explained later.
For the economic intuition, I carry out the same thought experiment as in the
previous case. Again, suppose there is a surprise tax cut or negative surplus shock in
period t−1, which forecasts lower path of future surpluses. This lowers the expected
present value of future surpluses on the RHS of (1.15), which is the expected surplus
14I use the quarterly U.S. data from 1947:2 to 2006:2. See Appendix 1.C.4 for data construction.
15The purpose of this case is to illustrate that the bias can be positive or negative. The
magnitude of the bias is of less importance, because it depends on the particular model setup and
the calibrated parameter values. The empirical significance of the simultaneity bias problem will
be explored in more depth in section 1.6.
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effect. Again, lower path of expected future surpluses leads to higher inflation in
period t − 1 via the wealth effect. Due to the assumption that 0 < α < 1, higher
inflation leads to higher nominal interest rate through the monetary policy rule.
According to the Fisher equation, expected inflation increases, which in turn raises
the expected present value of future seigniorage. I label it the expected seigniorage
effect, which operates in the opposite direction against the expected surplus effect.
In summary, the net effect of a negative surplus shock on bˆt−1 depends on the
tradeoff between the two effects and, therefore, the correlation between bˆt−1 and
ψˆt is ambiguous. Loosely speaking, given α, higher ρψ indicates stronger expected
surplus effect, which tends to reduce bˆt−1. Since bˆt−1 forecasts smaller ψˆt, bˆt−1 and ψˆt
are positively correlated, which results in a positive simultaneity bias. On the other
hand, given ρψ, higher α implies stronger expected seigniorage effect, which tends
to raise bˆt−1. Since bˆt−1 forecasts smaller ψˆt, bˆt−1 and ψˆt are negatively correlated,
which results in a negative simultaneity bias. These possibilities are displayed in
Figure 1.3.
With the above economic interpretation, the nonlinearity of the negative bias as
one increases α can be explained by the fact that the expected seigniorage effect
is nonlinear in α, which can be further explained by the underlying Laffer curve.
As the economy stays on the upward-sloping side of the Laffer curve, the expected
seigniorage effect becomes more dominant as α gets larger, which turns the corre-
lation between bˆt−1 and ψˆt from positive to negative. When the economy gets to
the downward-sloping side of the Laffer curve, higher α induces weaker expected
seigniorage effect, which makes the expected surplus effect relatively stronger and
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drives the bias up towards zero.
Case IV (AM/PF): α > 1, γ > 1, 0 < ρψ < 1
In this case, monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive. Under these
assumptions, I get16
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) = −
ρψσ
2
ψ
[1− (β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1))ρψ](1− ρ2ψ)
(1.20)
which is always negative because β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1) < 1 and 0 < ρψ < 1. Hence,
the simultaneity bias is negative, i.e. plimγˆOLS < γ, and the OLS estimator of γ
is inconsistent. Symmetrically to case II, γˆOLS may be significantly smaller than γ
so that the econometrician may mistakenly identify the underlying fiscal policy as
active.
The economic interpretation for this case is straightforward. Again, suppose there
is a surprise tax cut or negative surplus shock in period t− 1. It can be shown that
bˆt−1 increases on impact to finance the tax cut. According to the fiscal policy rule,
higher bˆt−1 raises lump-sum tax in period t, which neutralizes the wealth effect of
the tax cut to the point that inflation in period t− 1 keeps unaffected. This is the
standard story of Ricardian equivalence. As ρψ > 0, the increased bˆt−1 forecasts
a smaller ψˆt. Therefore, bˆt−1 is negatively correlated with ψˆt, which results in the
negative simultaneity bias.
16See Appendix 1.A.2 for more details.
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Summary
From these simple cases, it is clear that the simultaneity bias problem associated
with the OLS regression is prevailing in the parameter space as long as bˆt−1 forecasts
ψˆt, whatever the underlying DGP is. In fact, this problem could make correct
identification of fiscal policy behavior very difficult.
With PM/AF in the DGP, on one hand, fiscal policy could be very active, e.g.
γ could be zero. Thus bˆt−1 and τˆt have no link through the fiscal policy rule. On
the other hand, the covariance between bˆt−1 and ψˆt could be positive or negative
as long as bˆt−1 forecasts ψˆt. This makes the correlation between bˆt−1 and τˆt signifi-
cantly nonzero, which is captured by the IEC. When the econometrician runs OLS
regression using equilibrium data, the resulting γˆOLS may be significantly positive
or negative, which certainly does not reflect the true fiscal policy behavior. With
AM/PF in place, on one hand, the fiscal policy rule implies a positive mapping from
bˆt−1 to τˆt through γ. On the other hand, the negative covariance between bˆt−1 and ψˆt
could be very strong so that the overall correlation between bˆt−1 and τˆt is negative.
Overall, γˆOLS messes up the true fiscal policy behavior with the correlation between
bˆt−1 and τˆt that is captured by the IEC.
1.3.3 Monetary Policy Behavior and the Simultaneity Bias
In this section, I further illustrate the simultaneity bias problem by taking monetary
and fiscal policy interaction into account. I find out that the severity of simultaneity
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bias problem is related to the underlying monetary policy behavior, especially when
fiscal policy is active. An important empirical implication goes as follows. By
applying the OLS regression as in Bohn (1998), it is difficult to correctly identify a
world consistent with the fiscal theory of the price level (PM/AF). Hence, I argue
that correctly identifying monetary policy behavior provides useful information for
identifying fiscal policy behavior. Besides, from the perspective of the IEC (1.15),
the real value of the government debt is related to monetary policy behavior through
the discount factor. Therefore, missing monetary policy in the identification of
fiscal policy behavior is inherently subject to the simultaneity bias problem, which
confirms the necessity of jointly identifying both the monetary and the fiscal policy
behavior.
For illustration, I set up grids in the (α, γ) space, over which I numerically eval-
uate the simultaneity bias. Specifically, for the region corresponding to PM/AF,
both parameters range from 0.01 to 0.99 with increments of 0.01; for the region
corresponding to AM/PF, both parameters range from 1.01 to 1.99 with increments
of 0.01. For both regions, I calibrate (y, β, δ, γ0, ρθ, ρψ, σθ, σψ) in the same way as in
case III of the previous section. To calibrate (ρθ, ρψ, σθ, σψ), I construct the series of
θˆt and ψˆt based on (1.69) and (1.74) in Appendix 1.A.1. I then obtain (ρθ, ρψ, σθ, σψ)
by running simple regressions on (1.76) and (1.77) in Appendix 1.A.1. Thus, for
each grid point, I have a unique set of (ρθ, ρψ, σθ, σψ) that is consistent with the U.S.
data.
Based on the analytical result in Appendix 1.A.2, I calculate the simultaneity
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bias for both regions, which are displayed in the left panels of Figure 1.4 and 1.5.
For clarity, I provide the associated contour plots in the right panels. In Figure
1.4, which is for the region of PM/AF, it is noticeable that the bias is positive
when α is relatively small (α < 0.21), i.e. when monetary policy is very passive.
This is because when α is very small, the expected surplus effect dominates the
expected seigniorage effect, which implies positive correlation between bˆt−1 and ψˆt
and thus positive bias. In this area, monetary policy is very passive and the nominal
interest rate is nearly pegged. Hence, the volatility of the expected inflation and
the expected seigniorage is relatively small compared to the cases in which α is
large. From (1.15), it is easy to see that the volatility of bˆt−1 is relatively small.
According to (1.14), the simultaneity bias is relatively large in magnitude. By
fixing γ and increasing α, i.e. monetary policy gets more active, the bias gradually
becomes negative because the expected seigniorage effect becomes dominant over
the expected surplus effect. However, the negative bias is nonlinear in α, which is
indicated by the U-shaped plane. This can be explained by the underlying Laffer
curve, which has been mentioned earlier. In figure 1.5, which is for the region of
AM/PF, the bias is always negative and turns out to be a downward-sloping plane in
γ. This is because as γ gets larger, tax responds to government debt more strongly.
This makes the expected seigniorage less volatile because the wealth effect is weaker.
According to (1.15), var(bˆt−1) gets smaller and the bias gets larger in magnitude.
From the pattern of the simultaneity bias in Figure 1.4, it is clear that an active
fiscal policy is very hard to identify by the OLS regression when the monetary policy
in place is very passive. This is because when monetary policy is very passive, such
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as interest rate pegging (α ≈ 0), the OLS estimator of γ is significantly biased up.
Considering the empirical literature trying to identify fiscal policy behavior or test
fiscal sustainability by the OLS regression, such as Bohn (1998) for the U.S. data,
most papers get results favoring passive fiscal policy. In another word, a world
consistent with the fiscal theory of the price level (PM/AF) is rarely identified in
practice by the OLS regression. Connecting with my analysis, it might be the case
that the fiscal policy in place was actually active, which is just not identifiable by
the OLS regression because the monetary policy in place was very passive and the
OLS estimator of fiscal policy rule is significantly biased up.
1.4 Fiscal Policy Inertia and GMM: An Analyti-
cal Investigation
Unlike the OLS regression as in Bohn (1998), another strand of the empirical lit-
erature that estimates simple fiscal policy rules proposes to take policy inertia into
account. As people in this literature argue, policy inertia is supported by the insti-
tutional feature of fiscal policy, i.e. fiscal policy instruments adjust only gradually
towards their targets. In practice, people add lagged primary surpluses to the right-
hand side of the simple fiscal policy rules as explanatory variables17. In the context
of the illustrative DSGE model specified in the previous section, a typical fiscal
17In the literature of estimating simple fiscal policy rules, it is very common to add the first
lag of the primary surplus as an explanatory variable. Note, the simultaneous equations approach
proposed in this paper allows for more general fiscal policy rules that include more lags of the
primary surplus.
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policy rule with policy inertia is in the following form
τˆt = (1− ω)τˆt−1 + ωγbˆt−1 + ψˆt (1.21)
in which the fiscal authority is allowed to smooth primary surplus by responding to
its first lag. (1 − ω) represents the persistence in the surplus. ωγ and γ represent
the short-run and the long-run responses of surplus to lagged government debt,
respectively.
Recalling the OLS regression analyzed in the previous section, serial correlation in
the fiscal shock is sufficient for bˆt−1 to forecast ψˆt, which results in the simultaneity
bias problem. In the literature with built-in policy inertia, people usually argue that
τˆt−1 soaks up the serial correlation in ψˆt so that the simultaneity bias problem can
be avoided. Therefore, bˆt−1 is always assumed to be orthogonal to ψˆt implicitly. The
related work includes the linear IV estimation as in Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) and the
GMM estimation as in Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Claeys (2006,
2008).
In this section, I illustrate that simply adding τˆt−1 to the fiscal policy rule does
not necessarily soak up the serial correlation in ψˆt. Even when it soaks up the serial
correlation in ψˆt, bˆt−1 is still likely to forecast ψˆt. Due to the forward-looking nature
of government debt, bˆt−1 and ψˆt are very likely to be correlated, even with policy
inertia. This undermines the reliability of the inferences drawn by the IV and the
GMM estimation.
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For illustration, an example is given by modifying the model specified earlier. The
modification is in two aspects. First, the original fiscal policy rule (1.13) is replaced
by (1.21). Second, an information assumption on ψˆt is made following the literature
of fiscal foresight (or anticipated shock)18, which argues that fiscal shocks may be
learnt by economic agents before they fully materialize. A general reason for this
information assumption is the legislative lag and the implementation lag that are
inherent in the fiscal policy making process. Specifically, I assume the fiscal shock
process as
ψˆt = ρψψˆt−1 + φε
ψ
t−1 + (1− φ)εψt (1.22)
in which one-period foresight is assumed19. The conventional information assump-
tion sets φ = 0. When φ = 1, economic agents have complete one-period foresight,
i.e. fiscal shock (news) occurring at period t − 1 does not materialize until period
t. To simplify the illustration, I also assume α = γ = ρθ = ρψ = 0, which implies
that passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy are in place. So the bounded
equilibrium is determinate.
Following the solution procedure in Appendix 1.B, I can show that
bˆt =
(1− ω)(1− β)
1− β + ωβ τˆt + β(ϕ1 + ϕ4)ε
θ
t +
(1− β)φ
1− β + ωβε
ψ
t (1.23)
18Examples include Leeper (1989), Yang (2005), Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008, 2009),
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008), among others.
19One-period foresight is assumed to simplify the illustration. One can certainly generalize
(1.22) by specifying a longer foresight, which will not change the nature of the problem examined
here.
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in which
τˆt = (1− ω)τˆt−1 + ψˆt = (1− ω)τˆt−1 + φεψt−1 + (1− φ)εψt (1.24)
Then it is easy to show that
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) =
[
(1− ω)(1− β)(1− φ)φ+ (1− β)φ2
1− β + ωβ
]
σ2ψ > 0 (1.25)
The economic interpretation of the positive covariance in (1.25) is straightforward.
Suppose there is a surprise tax cut or negative surplus shock in period t − 1, i.e.
εψt−1 < 0 or ψˆt−1 < 0. On impact, τˆt−1 decreases according to (1.24). Although ψˆt
has no autoregressive term by assumption (ρψ = 0), ψˆt−1 and ψˆt are still correlated
due to the moving average term in (1.22)20. Hence, ψˆt is expected to decrease.
Because of the decrease in τˆt−1 and the expected decrease in ψˆt, τˆt is expected to
decrease according to (1.24), which induces the expected surplus effect and reduces
the right-hand side of the IEC (1.15). As a result, bˆt−1 decreases. In summary, bˆt−1
forecasts ψˆt and proves to be positively correlated with ψˆt.
When φ = 1, (1.24) and (1.25) are simplified as
τˆt = (1− ω)τˆt−1 + ψˆt = (1− ω)τˆt−1 + φεψt−1 (1.26)
20With one-period foresight, serial correlation in ψˆt only lasts for one period before it disappears,
e.g. ψˆt−1 and ψˆt are correlated. By introducing higher order fiscal foresight or adding more moving
average terms to the fiscal shock process, serial correlation in ψˆt can last for longer periods. Note,
this generalization will not change the nature of the problem examined here.
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and
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) =
(1− β)σ2ψ
1− β + ωβ > 0 (1.27)
Obviously, even when ψˆt is serially uncorrelated, bˆt−1 is still likely to forecast ψˆt,
which results in the simultaneity bias problem.
The central message from this example is that including lagged surpluses in a fiscal
policy rule still misses the IEC and the monetary policy behavior and, therefore,
is not a robust solution to the simultaneity bias problem. This implies that the
empirical results from the IV and the GMM estimation may be unreliable. Taking
the GMM estimation as example, with one-period foresight, not only bˆt−1 but also
other variables such as τˆt−1 is correlated with ψˆt. With more moving average terms
in the fiscal shock process, more lags of the variables become correlated with ψˆt.
These pitfalls leave a wide range of orthogonality conditions in the GMM estimation
questionable.
1.5 Empirical Analysis: The Existing Approaches
To contrast the existing limited-information approaches to the simultaneous equa-
tions approach that is introduced later, I first run an OLS regression on a simple
fiscal policy rule using the U.S. annual data. Then I apply GMM estimation to a
simple nonlinear fiscal policy rule using the quarterly U.S. data. In addition, I use
the quarterly U.S. data to estimate and identify a bivariate VAR composed of sur-
plus/GDP and total government liabilities/GDP. The qualitative results from these
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estimation are consistent with the main findings of the existing literature.
1.5.1 The OLS Regression
First, I run an OLS regression on a simple fiscal policy rule using the U.S. annual
data from 1948 to 1990. The fiscal policy rule is the one proposed by Bohn (1998),
as shown in (1.3). For readers’ convenience, it is reported as below.
τt = ρ · bt−1 + α0 + αG ·GV ARt + αY · Y V ARt + t
The data are taken from the technical appendix to Bohn (1998).
As a result, the point estimate of ρ, i.e. ρˆOLS, is 0.041. The 90% confidence
interval is [0.017, 0.065], which is computed with Newey-West heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation- consistent standard error with lag window of size 1. Obvi-
ously, the coefficient on lagged government debt is significantly positive and is also
quantitatively reasonable according to the argument of Bohn (1998). The value of
ρˆOLS means that a marginal increase in government debt by $100 would increase
the primary surplus in the following year by $4.10. The qualitative result here is
consistent with the main conclusion of Bohn (1998), even though the time span I
choose is different from Bohn (1998). Specifically, I may conclude that the U.S.
government has been systematically responding to the state of government debt
and, therefore, the postwar U.S. fiscal policy is sustainable. According to Woodford
(1995)’s terminology, I may infer that the postwar U.S. fiscal policy on average can
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be identified as Ricardian.
1.5.2 The GMM Method
Now I apply GMM method to a simple nonlinear fiscal policy rule using the quarterly
U.S. data. The fiscal policy rule is the one specified in Claeys (2006), as shown in
(1.4). For readers’ convenience, it is reported as below.
τt = ρτt−1 + (1− ρ) [δ + γxt + βpit + ωit + θbt−1] + εt
As in Claeys (2006), all of the real quantity variables [τt, xt, bt−1] are scaled by the
real potential output21. In particular, τt−1 enters to capture policy inertia, which
is measured by the persistence parameter ρ. The parameter of more interest is θ,
which measures the long-run response of primary surplus to lagged government debt
and characterizes fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization.
To apply GMM estimation to the fiscal policy rules like (1.4), the literature gen-
erally assumes that τt−1 soaks up potential serial correlation in the fiscal shock so
that εt is “orthogonal” to the past information set, including the lagged government
debt bt−j (for j ≥ 1). Therefore, a set of “orthogonalization” conditions as (1.28)
can be obtained.
{[τt − ρτt−1 − (1− ρ)(δ + γxt + βpit + ωit + θbt−1)]z˜t} = 0 (1.28)
21The real potential output is constructed by the Congressional Budget Office and is downloaded
from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT?cid=106.
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in which z˜t denotes a set of instrumental variables that are “orthogonal” to εt.
Specifically, I choose z˜t to include [1, τt−1, xt−1, pit−1, it−1, bt−1]. In addition, I follow
Claeys (2006) to include some other variables in z˜t, which represent domestic and
international monetary conditions and supply-side factors. They are the first lags
of the M3, the producer price index (PPI), the 10-year treasury bond yield (iLong),
Germany short-term interest rate (iGermany), the exchange rate between Germany
and the U.S. (DEMUSD) and the NAIRU22.
The baseline GMM estimate of the fiscal policy rule (1.4) is shown in Table 1.123.
Since the focus is exclusively on θ, only the result of θˆGMM is reported. Due to the
difference in data availability over different time spans, four cases are investigated
based on different sets of instrumental variables. Time span for each case is listed
in the first column of Table 1.1. From the baseline result, it is clear that θˆGMM is
significantly positive and is quantitatively comparable across all the cases. At 5%
level, the orthogonalization condition (1.28) is not rejected by Hansen’s J test for
all the cases. The qualitative result confirms the argument in Claeys (2006) that
U.S. fiscal policy is sustainable or Ricardian.
To check robustness of the baseline result, I implement two experiments. First, I
expand the set of instrumental variables for all the cases by including the second lags
of the variables. Results are shown in Table 1.2. Obviously, this experiment does not
change the baseline result either qualitatively or quantitatively. Second, I estimate
22The M3, PPI and DEMUSD are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data-
FRED. The iLong is from the website of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. iGermany is
from OECD.Stat Extracts. The NAIRU is constructed by the Congressional Budget Office and is
downloaded from the Global Insight.
23The GMM estimation is implemented based on the MATLAB package provided by Michael
Cliff with documentation Cliff (2003).
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(1.4) with annual data over the same time span for all the cases. As shown in Table
1.3, the qualitative result of the baseline estimation is not affected. Quantitatively,
θˆGMM with annual data approximately quadruples the magnitude of θˆGMM of the
baseline result. This pattern, which prevails in all the cases, may be explained by
the time aggregation in the annual data. Compared with Claeys (2006), the result
here with annual data indicates a much stronger response of primary surplus to
lagged government debt.
1.5.3 The Bivariate VAR
Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), I estimate and identify a bivariate
VAR to draw inferences on the U.S. fiscal policy behavior. The data include primary
surplus/GDP and total government liabilities/GDP. Unlike the single-equation ap-
proaches, e.g. OLS and GMM, the bivariate VAR focuses on the impulse response
of liabilities/GDP to a positive surplus/GDP shock.
The impulse responses of surplus/GDP and liabilities/GDP to a positive sur-
plus/GDP shock are shown in Figure 1.6. The initial shock is assumed to be 1% of
the steady-state surplus/GDP. The impulse response of each variable is scaled by
its steady-state value. The baseline estimation result, which is based on the U.S.
quarterly data over the sample 1947:2-2006:2, is shown in the top panel of Figure
1.6. The VAR features three lags and a constant. The variables in the VAR are
ordered as surplus/GDP and liabilities/GDP. As in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
(2001), identification of the structural VAR is based on Cholesky decomposition.
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Clearly, qualitative result of the baseline estimation is consistent with the dynamics
shown in the top panel of Figure 3 of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001). Particu-
larly, a positive surplus/GDP shock induces a significant increase in surplus/GDP,
which lasts for more than one year on 90% level. The liabilities/GDP significantly
decreases on impact and keeps declining for a long time, i.e. about three years on
90% level. According to the argument of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), the
impulse responses of the baseline result favor a Ricardian interpretation of the U.S.
data more than a non-Ricardian one.
To check robustness of the baseline result, I estimate and identify a VAR using the
U.S. annual data over the same time span, i.e. 1947-2006. The VAR features five
lags and a constant. The estimation result is shown in the bottom panel of Figure
1.6. Basically, the pattern of impulse responses of the baseline result is not affected.
The only difference is the decrease of liabilities/GDP, which is significant for about
ten years on both 68% and 90% levels. This is much longer than the baseline result
but is closer to the result of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), i.e. the top-right
panel of Figure 3 of that paper.
1.6 Empirical Analysis: A Simultaneous Equa-
tions Approach
From the previous illustration, it is clear that the simultaneity bias problem is
prevailing when a simple fiscal policy rule is estimated in isolation from the IEC and
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the monetary policy rule. In this section, a fundamental solution to the problem is
explored. Theoretically, the problem can be solved by estimating a fiscal policy rule
jointly with the IEC and the monetary policy rule in the simultaneous equations
framework. However, the implementation of the ideal solution is not straightforward
because the IEC is a present-value relation that contains an infinite sum. As an
alternative, I take the IEC indirectly to the estimation by using the methodology
advocated in Chung and Leeper (2009). Specifically, I impose the cross-equation
restrictions implied by the IEC on a VAR instead of estimating the IEC directly. The
approach is applied to the postwar U.S. data. By adopting the identification scheme
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004), I recover
the structural VAR that includes both the monetary and the fiscal policy rules and
draw inferences on the postwar U.S. fiscal policy behavior. Since information of the
IEC and the monetary policy behavior is embedded in the estimation, the approach
is free of the simultaneity bias problem and the associated identification results are
reliable.
In this section, I first review the necessary details of Chung and Leeper (2009)’s
methodology for clarity. Then I describe the data set and the identification scheme
of the VAR. Finally, I report the estimation results.
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1.6.1 Government Budget Constraint and the IEC
First, I define the nominal market value of total government debt outstanding at
time t, Vt, as
Vt ≡
∞∑
j=1
Bt(j)Qt(j) (1.29)
in which Bt(j) is the nominal face value at time t of a zero coupon bond maturing
at t + j and Qt(j) is the market price of Bt(j). I also define the nominal primary
surplus, St ,as
St = Tt −Gt − Zt (1.30)
in which Tt is the federal taxes, Gt is the government spending and Zt is the net
transfers. The government budget constraint is then given by
∞∑
j=1
[Bt(j)−Bt−1(j + 1)]Qt(j) = Bt−1(1)− St − (Mt −Mt−1) (1.31)
in which Mt is the nominal money balance and Mt−Mt−1 is the nominal seigniorage
revenues. It can be shown that the government budget constraint (1.31) is equivalent
to
Vt
Pt
=
Pt−1
PtQt−1(1)
Vt−1
Pt−1
− St
Pt
− (Mt −Mt−1)
Pt
+ νt (1.32)
in which Pt is the aggregate price level and
νt ≡ 1
Pt
∞∑
j=1
[
Qt(j)− Qt−1(j + 1)
Qt−1(1)
]
Bt−1(j + 1) (1.33)
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Now I define the total nominal government liabilities as Wt = Vt +Mt. In terms of
Wt, government budget constraint (1.32) can be written as
Wt
Pt
=
Pt−1
PtQt−1(1)
Wt−1
Pt−1
− St
Pt
−
[
Pt−1
PtQt−1(1)
− Pt−1
Pt
]
Mt−1
Pt−1
+ νt (1.34)
Let the one-period nominal interest rate at time t − 1 be Rt−1 = Q−1t−1(1). In real
terms, government budget constraint (1.34) becomes
wt =
Rt−1
pit
wt−1 − st − 1
pit
(Rt−1 − 1)mt−1 + νt (1.35)
in which wt ≡ Wt/Pt, st ≡ St/Pt ≡ Tt/Pt − Gt/Pt − Zt/Pt ≡ tt − gt − zt ≡ τt − gt,
mt ≡ Mt/Pt and the inflation rate pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1. Note, I define the taxes net of
transfers (or net taxes) as τt ≡ tt − zt.
To derive the IEC, I assume there is an equilibrium model generating the data
and the Euler equation for the nominal zero coupon bond is given by
Qt(j) = δ
jEt
λt+j
λt
Pt
Pt+j
(1.36)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount rate and λt is the Lagrangian multiplier
of the associated household problem. Applying (1.36) in (1.33), I get
νt ≡ 1
λt
∞∑
j=1
δj
(
Et
λt+j
Pt+j
− λt
Pt
Et−1
λt+j
Pt+j
Et−1 λtPt
)
Bt−1(j + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηt
(1.37)
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or ηt ≡ λtνt. It can be easily shown that, for l ≥ 1,
Et+l−1ηt+l = Et+l−1
∞∑
j=1
δj
Et+l λt+l+j
Pt+l+j
− λt+l
Pt+l
Et+l−1
λt+l+j
Pt+l+j
Et+l−1
λt+l
Pt+l
Bt+l−1(j + 1) = 0
Hence, by the law of iterated expectations,
Etηt+l = 0, for l ≥ 1 (1.38)
In equilibrium, the transversality condition for the household problem always holds
as
lim
s−→∞
Etλt+s
Wt+s
Pt+s
= 0 (1.39)
By iterating (1.34) forward, imposing (1.38) and (1.39) and taking expectation con-
ditional on the information set at time t, I finally get the IEC, which, in real terms,
is
wt = Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1
)[
st+j + pi
−1
t+j(Rt+j−1 − 1)mt+j−1
]
(1.40)
For the purpose of linearizing the government budget constraint and the IEC
around a stationary steady state, I scale all the real quantity variables in (1.35)
and (1.40) by the real output yt ≡ Yt/Pt. Let the real output growth rate be
µt ≡ Yt/PtYt−1/Pt−1 . The scaled versions of (1.35) and (1.40) are then given by
wt =
Rt−1
pitµt
wt−1 − st − 1
pitµt
(Rt−1 − 1)mt−1 + Ptνt
Yt
(1.41)
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and
wt = Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k
)[
st+j + (Rt+j−1 − 1) mt+j−1
pit+jµt+j
]
(1.42)
in which wt, st and mt are ratios of the corresponding real quantity variables to the
real output.
Next, I log-linearize the government budget constraint and the IEC around the
stationary steady state and express all the variables in logarithm. In the stationary
steady state, equilibrium condition (1.36) implies β ≡ piµ/R, where β is the inverse
of the steady state growth-adjusted real interest rate. The linearized version of
(1.41) is given by
τ
w
τ˜t − g
w
g˜t +
[
1
β
− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
µ˜t +
[
1
β
− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
p˜it + w˜t
= k1 +
1
β
(
1− m
w
)
R˜t−1 − (R− 1)m
piµw
m˜t−1 +
1
β
w˜t−1 + d
(
Ptνt
Yt
)
(1.43)
in which
k1 ≡ τ
w
ln (τ)− g
w
ln (g) +
[
1
β
− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
ln(µ) +
[
1
β
− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
ln(pi)
− 1
β
(
1− m
w
)
ln(R) +
(R− 1)m
piµw
ln (m)−
(
1
β
− 1
)
ln (w) (1.44)
In (1.43), since the term Ptνt/Yt can take negative values, I just take its deviation
from the corresponding linearization point instead of log-linearizing it. Note, all the
variables in (1.43) with a tilde are in logarithm and all the variables in (1.43) and
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(1.44) without time subscript are steady state values. In particular, τ , g, m and w
are the steady state ratios of the corresponding real quantity variables to the real
output. Similarly, the linearized version of (1.42) is given by24
w˜t = k2 + Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
τ
w
τ˜t+j − g
w
g˜t+j +
(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
µ˜t+j
]
+ Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
p˜it+j −
(
κ− Rm
piµw
)
R˜t+j−1 +
(R− 1)m
piµw
m˜t+j−1
]
(1.45)
in which κ =
[
s
w
+ (R−1)m
piµw
] (
1
1−β
)
and
k2 ≡ ln (w)− β
1− β
[
κln(β) +
τ
w
ln(τ)− g
w
ln(g)− (R− 1)m
piµw
ln(µ)
]
+
β
1− β
[
(R− 1)m
piµw
ln(pi)− Rm
piµw
ln(R)− (R− 1)m
piµw
ln(m)
]
(1.46)
One novel feature of the approach proposed by Chung and Leeper (2009) is that
maturity structure of government debt and term structure of interest rates are taken
into account when the government budget constraint is derived. This has two impor-
tant implications. First, the government budget constraint is more consistent with
the real data than the conventional budget constraint that only includes one-period
debt and short-term interest rate. Second, an error term, i.e. νt, is introduced
to the government budget constraint and disappears in expectation. To derive the
cross-equation restrictions from the IEC, all the variables in the IEC, which are
also the variables in the government budget constraint, should be kept in the VAR.
24See Appendix 1.C.1 for more details of the derivation of (1.45)-(1.46).
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With the conventional government budget constraint in place, stochastic singularity
problem may arise because the conventional budget constraint always holds as an
identity. Fortunately, the problem is avoided by having νt in the government budget
constraint.
1.6.2 Cross-Equation Restrictions on the VAR
Suppose the state of the economy is characterized by the n-dimensional factors ft
which evolve according to the VAR(p) process
ft = B0 + ft−1B1 + · · ·+ ft−pBp + ut (1.47)
In the empirical model to be estimated, n = 7 and ft = [τ˜t, g˜t, µ˜t, p˜it, R˜t, m˜t, w˜t] is a
(1×7) vector, B0 and ut are (1×n) vectors, Bi is an (n×n) matrix for i = 1, . . . , p.
Also suppose all model variables x˜t are related to the factors ft through the mapping
x˜t = ftCx (1.48)
where, for example, the selection vector Cτ is simply defined as Cτ ≡ [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]′.
Both ft and x˜t are measured in logarithm.
To derive the cross-equation restrictions from the IEC, it is convenient to fit (1.47)
in companion form and express it as a VAR(1) process
f¯t = B¯0 + f¯t−1B + u¯t (1.49)
42
in which f¯t = [ft, ft−1, . . . , ft−p+1], B¯0 = [B0,01×n(p−1)] and u¯t = [ut,01×n(p−1)] are
all (1× np) vectors and B is an (np× np) matrix which is defined as
B ≡

B1 In 0n · · · 0n
B2 0n In · · · 0n
...
...
...
. . .
...
Bp−1 0n 0n · · · In
Bp 0n 0n · · · 0n

in which In is an n-dimensional identity matrix and 0n is an (n × n) zero square
matrix. Accordingly, the mapping (1.48) becomes
x˜t = f¯tC¯x (1.50)
in which all C¯x are now (np× 1) vectors, e.g. C¯τ = [C ′τ ,0′n(p−1)×1]′.
Appendix 1.C.2 shows that the IEC (1.45) implies the following cross-equation
restrictions on the VAR coefficients B¯0 and B, which will be imposed in the estima-
tion25:
βB
{
τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g +
[
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
C¯µ +
[
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
C¯pi + C¯w
}
=
(
κβ − m
w
)
C¯R − (R− 1)m
Rw
C¯m + C¯w (1.51)
25Note, only (1.51) is imposed in the current estimation. The imposition of (1.52), which implies
restrictions on the deterministic growth components of the VAR, is left for the future research.
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k2 +
(
β
1− β
)
B¯0(I − βB)−1
[
τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g +
(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
C¯µ
]
+
(
β
1− β
)
B¯0(I − βB)−1
[(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
C¯pi +
(m
w
− κβ
)
C¯R
]
+
(
β
1− β
)
B¯0(I − βB)−1
[
(R− 1)m
Rw
C¯m
]
= 0 (1.52)
1.6.3 Estimation Procedure
To estimate the unrestricted VAR without imposing (1.51), I apply the standard
OLS regression. For the restricted VAR, I follow Chung and Leeper (2009) to apply
a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure, which is briefly described as
follows.
Suppose I want to estimate the reduced-form VAR(p) system (1.47)
ft = B0 + ft−1B1 + · · ·+ ft−pBp + ut (1.53)
or more compactly
ft = B0 + f−B− + ut (1.54)
in which f− = [ft−1, . . . , ft−p] is a (1×np) lagged data vector and B− = [B′1, . . . , B′p]′
is an (np×n) matrix. Then I stack the T + p observations in the form of (1.54) and
get
F = 1B0 + F−B− + u (1.55)
in which F is a (T × n) data matrix, 1 is a (T × 1) vector consisting of all 1’s,
F− is a (T × np) lagged data matrix and u is a (T × n) matrix. Next, I define
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X ≡ [1, F−], a (T × (np+ 1)) matrix, and [B′0, B′−]′, an ((np + 1)× n) matrix. Let
b ≡ vec([B′0, B′−]′), an (n(np+ 1)× 1) vector. Applying vec operator, I can express
(1.55) as
vec(F ) = (In ⊗X)b+ vec(u) (1.56)
The log-likelihood function corresponding to (1.56) is given by
L(b,Σ) = −nT
2
ln(2pi) +
1
2
ln
∣∣(Σ⊗ IT )−1∣∣− 1
2
[
vec(u)′(Σ⊗ IT )−1vec(u)
]
(1.57)
in which Σ is the cross-equation variance-covariance matrix.
The restriction (1.51) implied by the IEC can be simplified as
B−C1 = C¯0 (1.58)
in which C1, an (n× 1) vector, and C¯0, an (np× 1) vector, are given by
C1 ≡ β
{
τ
w
Cτ − g
w
Cg +
[
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
Cµ +
[
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
]
Cpi + Cw
}
C¯0 ≡
(
κβ − m
w
)
C¯R − (R− 1)m
Rw
C¯m + C¯w
(1.58) can be rewritten as
[0np×1, Inp][B′0, B
′
−]
′C1 = C¯0 (1.59)
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Applying vec operator on (1.59), I get
V b = vec(C¯0) (1.60)
in which V ≡ (C ′1 ⊗ [0np×1, Inp]).
The goal of the estimation is to choose b to maximize (1.57) subject to the con-
straint (1.60). Appendix 1.C.3 shows that b˜, the consistent estimator of b of the
restricted VAR, is given by
b˜ = bˆ+ S−1V ′(V S−1V ′)−1(vec(C¯0)− V bˆ) (1.61)
in which bˆ = vec((X ′X)−1 (X ′F )) is the OLS estimator of b of the unrestricted VAR
and S ≡ (Σ−1⊗X ′X). For implementation, I start with bˆ and use a FGLS procedure
based on (1.61), iterated until convergence, to get consistent estimators of b and Σ
of the restricted VAR. To obtain the distributions of the estimated parameters, I
adopt the bias-adjusted bootstrap procedure proposed by Kilian (1998).
1.6.4 VAR Specification
Data
To estimate the VAR, I use the quarterly U.S. data from 1947:2 to 2006:2. The vari-
ables in logarithm are listed as follows: net taxes (τ˜t), government spending (g˜t),
real GDP growth rate (µ˜t), GDP deflator inflation rate (p˜it), three-month Treasury
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bill rate (R˜t), monetary base (m˜t) and total government liabilities (w˜t). Note, all the
real quantity variables in the VAR are scaled by the real GDP, which forms a coin-
tegrated system. Appendix 1.C.4 provides more details of the data set construction,
which follows Chung and Leeper (2009) and Traum (2007).
Identification Scheme
Assume there is a structural VAR,
ftA = A0 + ft−1A1 + · · ·+ ft−pAp + εtJ (1.62)
which is a simultaneous equations system, underlying the reduced-form VAR (1.53).
Obviously, Bi = AiA
−1 and ut = εtJA−1, in which ut contains one-period ahead
forecasting errors from the reduced-form VAR and εt contains structural shocks that
are assumed to be orthogonal to each other.
To identify fiscal policy behavior, I need to recover εt from ut, which amounts to
identifying the contemporaneous matrix A. For this purpose, I adopt the identifi-
cation scheme originally proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended
by Perotti (2004). First, the block of fiscal variables is ordered before the other
variables. Specifically, I assume
uτt = ατµu
µ
t + ατpiu
pi
t + ατRu
R
t + Jτgε
g
t + ε
τ
t
ugt = αgµu
µ
t + αgpiu
pi
t + αgRu
R
t + Jgτε
τ
t + ε
g
t (1.63)
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in which all the α’s are elasticities that capture the automatic stabilizer embedded
in the fiscal policy. The α’s in this paper are constructed based on the results of the
previous literature26, e.g. Perotti (2004) and Chung and Leeper (2009). Other than
the automatic stabilizer, I assume fiscal policy does not respond to the state of the
economy discretionarily within a quarter. According to this recursive ordering, the
first two equations of the system represent the fiscal policy rules. Note, Jτg and Jgτ
in (1.63) are from the matrix J , which is a block diagonal matrix with the first block
at the upper-left corner a two-dimensional matrix corresponding to the two fiscal
shocks. For the estimation of this paper, I follow Chung and Leeper (2009) and
choose the orthogonalization so that net taxes is ordered the first in the system27,
i.e. Jτg = 0.
In order to identify the whole matrix A, I assume the recursive ordering of the
remaining variables as [µ˜t, p˜it, R˜t, m˜t, w˜t], from left to right. For example, I assume
uµt = αµτu
τ
t + αµgu
g
t + ε
µ
t (1.64)
Then I treat the identified fiscal shocks, (εˆτt , εˆ
g
t ), as instruments of (u
τ
t , u
g
t ) and run
IV estimation on (1.64). Consistent estimates of (αµτ , αµg) are obtained in this way.
Equations like (1.64) for the other four variables can be written down recursively
and the other elements in A can be identified accordingly.
26Appendix 1.C.5 provides details for constructing the elasticities.
27As a robustness check, I also try another orthogonalization, i.e. Jgτ = 0. It turns out that the
choice of orthogonalization does not affect the results much, which is consistent with the earlier
finding in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004).
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1.6.5 Estimation Results
Finally, I apply the simultaneous equations approach to identify the U.S. fiscal au-
thority’s stance on debt stabilization, which is free of the simultaneity bias problem a
priori. Based on the quarterly U.S. data from 1947:2 to 2006:2, the baseline estima-
tion features a VAR with two lags and a constant according to Bayesian information
criterion (BIC). The steady-state values for the FGLS procedure are calibrated at
sample means of the data set. To estimate distributions of the model parameters,
the bias-adjusted bootstrap procedure proposed by Kilian (1998) is adopted.
To calculate the long-run response of surplus/GDP to lagged government debt/GDP,
I start by considering a marginal increase in liabilities/GDP from the steady state,
i.e. ∆wt > 0. Since wt = vt+mt, I assume that part of ∆wt is brought about by ∆vt
and the remaining part is due to ∆mt. I further assume that, on average, ∆vt/∆wt
and ∆mt/∆wt are given by the steady-state ratios v/w and m/w, respectively. Note,
∆s
∆w
=
s
w
LREsw and
∆s
∆m
=
s
m
LREsm
in which LREsw and LREsm are the long-run elasticities of surplus/GDP to lia-
bilities/GDP and monetary base/GDP, respectively. Recalling that st = τt − gt, I
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calculate LREsw and LREsm as follows
LREsw ≡
∞∑
j=1
ds˜t
dw˜t−j
=
τ
s
∞∑
j=1
dτ˜t
dw˜t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
LREτw
−g
s
∞∑
j=1
dg˜t
dw˜t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
LREgw
LREsm ≡
∞∑
j=1
ds˜t
dm˜t−j
=
τ
s
∞∑
j=1
dτ˜t
dm˜t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
LREτm
−g
s
∞∑
j=1
dg˜t
dm˜t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
LREgm
in which LREτw and LREτm are the long-run elasticities of net taxes/GDP to lia-
bilities/GDP and monetary base/GDP, respectively. Likewise, LREgw and LREgm
are the long-run elasticities of spending/GDP to liabilities/GDP and monetary
base/GDP, respectively. Note, [LREτw, LREτm, LREgw, LREgm] are computed
based on the first two equations of the identified VAR. Therefore, the long-run
response of surplus/GDP to lagged government debt/GDP is given by
∆s
∆v
=
∆w ∗ s/w ∗ LREsw −∆w ∗m/w ∗ s/m ∗ LREsm
∆w ∗ v/w =
s
v
LREsw − s
v
LREsm
(1.65)
in which ∆s is the long-run deviation of surplus/GDP from the steady state brought
about by the marginal increase in lagged government debt/GDP, i.e. ∆v.
The point estimate of ∆s/∆v from the baseline estimation is 0.0039, with the
90% confidence interval [−0.3980, 0.5574]. In terms of annual rate, ∆s/∆v is ap-
proximately 0.0155, which is less than half of the magnitude obtained from the OLS
regression. In terms of quarterly rate, ∆s/∆v is about one-thirteenth of the mag-
nitude obtained from the baseline GMM estimation. In a word, the simultaneous
equations approach estimates a much weaker response of surplus/GDP to lagged
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government debt/GDP in the long run. Besides, the interval estimate of ∆s/∆v is
much wider than those reported by the single-equation approaches28. This implies
that the true value of ∆s/∆v is very uncertain. More importantly, the interval
estimate of ∆s/∆v contains zero, which means that the long-run response is not
significantly different from zero on 90% level.
From the baseline estimation, I also identify the monetary policy behavior by cal-
culating the long-run response of nominal interest rate to inflation, i.e. ∆R/∆pi. It
can be easily computed from the monetary policy rule, which is the fifth equation
of the identified VAR. The point estimate of ∆R/∆pi is 1.3143, with the 90% con-
fidence interval [0.4011, 2.4725]. According to the point estimates of ∆R/∆pi and
∆s/∆v, both the monetary and the fiscal policy are inferred as being active, which
is not consistent with our prior belief that the underlying dynamics of the economy
is stationary.
Following Chung and Leeper (2009), I also investigate the forward-looking aspect
of fiscal financing. In particular, I calculate the present-value components of govern-
ment debt based on (1.45). The baseline result is shown in Table 1.4. The present-
value decomposition shows what combination of adjustments in the expected paths
of fiscal policy instruments, discount rates and seigniorage rationalizes the observed
market value of government debt. Fiscal shocks are normalized to raise debt/GDP
28With the simultaneous equations approach, the data-generating process is completely specified
and is simulated using bootstrap method. This procedure accounts for the small-sample uncertainty
in the parameters. While with the single-equation approaches, the advantage of the simultaneous
equations approach mentioned earlier becomes infeasible and the confidence intervals are computed
based on the asymptotic standard errors, which underestimate the small-sample uncertainty of the
parameters. This may, to some extent, explain the huge difference in the width of the confidence
intervals provided by different approaches.
51
from the steady state by 1%. From the baseline result, it is clear that future ad-
justments in fiscal policy depend on the nature of the fiscal shock. Specifically, the
primary surplus component moves to support debt only when the debt innovation is
financed by a spending hike. With a net taxes cut, the primary surplus component
is offsetting the movement in debt, possibly because of the persistence in net taxes.
Note, the movement of primary surplus is insignificant in both cases.
In summary, the long-run response of primary surplus to lagged government debt is
insignificant if a fiscal policy rule is jointly estimated with the IEC and the monetary
policy rule. This result holds both in terms of ∆s/∆v and from the forward-looking
perspective of fiscal financing. Compared with the single-equation approaches such
as OLS and GMM, the empirical implications on the U.S. fiscal policy behavior
drawn by the simultaneous equations approach is qualitatively different.
As a contrast to the bivariate VAR, I compute the impulse responses of sur-
plus/GDP and liabilities/GDP based on the simultaneous equations approach. Fis-
cal shocks are normalized to raise surplus/GDP from the steady state by 1%. The
baseline result is shown in Figure 1.7, from which it is clear that the dynamics of
the variables show different patterns depending on the nature of the fiscal shock.
In the left panel of Figure 1.7, the 1% increase in surplus/GDP that is financed by
a surprise net taxes hike is only significantly positive on impact. The dynamics of
surplus/GDP is U-shaped, which is insignificant in the first quarter after the initial
shock and then becomes significantly negative for 17 quarters on 68% level and 11
quarters on 90% level. For the liabilities/GDP, the median response on impact is
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to increase by 0.01%, which is significant on both 68% and 90% levels. The dy-
namics is hump-shaped because of the U-shaped dynamics of surplus/GDP. Also,
the impulse response of liabilities/GDP remains significantly positive for 10 years
on 68% level and 35 quarters on 90% level. When the 1% increase in surplus/GDP
is financed by a surprise spending cut, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1.7,
the surplus/GDP increases a little 1 quarter later and then persistently declines.
It remains significantly positive for 3 quarters on 68% level and only 1 quarter on
90% level. Following the spending shock, the median response of liabilities/GDP on
impact is to decrease insignificantly by 0.0023%. It then remains insignificant for
10 years on both 68% and 90% levels.
Obviously, after imposing the cross-equation restrictions derived from the IEC on
the unrestricted VAR that includes both the monetary and the fiscal policy rules,
the patterns of the impulse responses observed in the bivariate VAR are overturned.
With the simultaneous equations approach, the increase in surplus/GDP is very
short-lived. The contemporaneous response of liabilities/GDP is either significantly
positive or insignificant, which can hardly be explained by the Ricardian interpre-
tation as argued in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001).
To check the robustness of the baseline results, some sensitivity analysis is carried
out. First, according to Akaike information criterion (AIC), a VAR with three lags
and a constant is estimated over the same sample as in the baseline estimation.
Second, considering the critical role played by the elasticities in (1.63), a proper
range of values for the elasticities is explored besides the particular set of values
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calculated in Appendix 1.C.5. Third, the simultaneous equations approach is applied
to different samples over which the OLS and GMM are estimated in the previous
sections. It turns out that making changes in these aspects does not affect the
qualitative results of the baseline estimation29.
1.7 Conclusion
In order to identify the fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization, the existing
limited-information approaches, such as the OLS, GMM and bivariate VAR, only
focus on estimating the fiscal policy rules, but fail to take the IEC of debt valuation
and the monetary policy behavior into account. This paper shows that, in general,
ignoring the IEC and the monetary policy behavior in the estimation results in
a simultaneity bias problem and, therefore, the corresponding inferences may be
misleading. The paper also shows that dealing with the specification of the fiscal
policy rules (e.g., introducing policy inertia) or the fiscal shock processes is not a
robust solution to the simultaneity bias problem. In order to solve the problem
fundamentally, I propose a simultaneous equations approach that incorporates the
IEC and the monetary policy rule in the estimation. Based on the post-World War
II U.S. data, I find out that, on average, a non-Ricardian interpretation of the U.S.
data is at least as plausible as a Ricardian one, which is completely different from
the results estimated by the OLS, GMM and bivariate VAR methods.
In this paper, jointly identifying both monetary and fiscal policy behavior is highly
29The estimation results of the sensitivity analysis is available from the author upon request.
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emphasized, because it not only avoids the simultaneity bias problem but also pro-
vides a better understanding of the nature of the economy. However, with both
kinds of policy behavior being inferred as active, the empirical results of this paper
leaves this question as a puzzle. Several things deserve further investigation in the
future work. First, only the point estimates are used to draw inferences on the
joint policy behavior in the current work. Obviously, the estimation uncertainty
needs to be taken into account as well. To accomplish this, Bayesian VAR may be
considered as a way to go. Second, the prior belief that the underlying dynamics
of the economy is stationary may not be right. So it is worthwhile to explore the
econometric methodology for a non-stationary VAR in the future. Last but not the
least, the monetary and the fiscal policy rules estimated in this paper are far more
complicated than the simple ones in the current literature. So the current criteria
to determine “active” or “passive”, which are originally proposed for the simple
policy rules, may be inappropriate for the complicated policy rules in this paper.
How to distinguish different policy behavior based on complicated policy rules is
still unclear in the literature, which is also beyond the scope of this paper.
Clearly, the simultaneous equations approach only identifies the averaged fiscal
policy behavior. According to the recent literature30, the U.S. post-World War II
fiscal regime was extremely variable. More precisely, the U.S. fiscal policy between
the 1960s and the 1980s may be characterized as active. It then gradually switched
to passive in the early 1990s and switched back to active in early 2001. Therefore,
to better identify the real fiscal policy behavior, regime-switching fiscal policy rules
30Examples include Favero and Monacelli (2003, 2005), Sala (2004), Davig and Leeper (2006)
and Davig, Leeper and Chung (2007), among others.
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should be used, which will be explored in the future.
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Appendix 1.A: The Illustrative DSGE Model
Appendix 1.A.1: Model Solution
To solve the model, I derive the first-order necessary conditions of the household
problem. Together with the aggregate resource constraint (1.8), I obtain the Fisher
equation and the money-demand relation as follows:
1
Rt
= βEt
[
1
pit+1
]
(1.66)
mt = δc
[
Rt
Rt − 1
]
(1.67)
in which mt ≡Mt/Pt is the real money balance.
Next, I log-linearize (1.66) and (1.9) as
Rˆt = Etpˆit+1 (1.68)
Rˆt = αpˆit + θˆt (1.69)
in which I impose the steady state condition R = β−1 and assume pi = 1 for a
zero-inflation steady state. Note, xˆt denotes log deviation of the generic variable xt
from its steady state value x, i.e. xˆt ≡ ln(xt)− ln(x). Combining (1.68) and (1.69),
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I get
Etpˆit+1 = αpˆit + θˆt (1.70)
I then define the one-period-ahead endogenous forecasting error ηt+1 ≡ pˆit+1 − Etpˆit+1
and express (1.70) as
pˆit+1 = αpˆit + θˆt + ηt+1 (1.71)
Next, I log-linearize (2.27), (1.67) and (1.10) as
mmˆt + bbˆt + τ τˆt = mmˆt−1 −mpˆit +RbRˆt−1 +Rbbˆt−1 −Rbpˆit (1.72)
m(R− 1)mˆt = R(δc−m)Rˆt (1.73)
τˆt = γbˆt−1 + ψˆt (1.74)
in which I impose the relevant steady state conditions. Combining (1.69), (2.37)-
(1.74) and rearranging terms, I get
ϕ1pˆit+ bˆt+ϕ2pˆit−1−
[
β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1)] bˆt−1+ϕ3θˆt+(β−1−1)ψˆt+ϕ4θˆt−1 = 0 (1.75)
in which
ϕ1 ≡ m
b
(αχ+ 1) + β−1
ϕ2 ≡ −α
[m
b
χ+ β−1
]
ϕ3 ≡ m
b
χ
ϕ4 ≡ −
[m
b
χ+ β−1
]
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and χ ≡ 1/(1−R) is the negative interest elasticity of money demand. It is straight-
forward to log-linearize (1.11) and (1.12) as
θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 + εθt (1.76)
ψˆt = ρψψˆt−1 + ε
ψ
t (1.77)
After substituting (1.76) and (1.77) into (1.75) and expressing terms one period
forwards, I get
ϕ1pˆit+1 + bˆt+1 = −ϕ2pˆit +
[
β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1)] bˆt − (ϕ3ρθ + ϕ4)θˆt − (β−1 − 1)ρψψˆt
−ϕ3εθt+1 − (β−1 − 1)εψt+1 (1.78)
So far, (1.71), (1.76)-(1.78) form a self-contained system governing the dynamics
of pˆit, bˆt, θˆt and ψˆt. The linearized system is organized in the following compact
form
Γ0Yt+1 = Γ1Yt + Πηt+1 + Ψεt+1 (1.79)
in which Yt+1 =
[
pˆit+1, bˆt+1, θˆt+1, ψˆt+1
]′
, εt+1 =
[
εθt+1, ε
ψ
t+1
]′
and
Γ0 =

1 0 0 0
ϕ1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

, Π =

1
0
0
0

, Ψ =

0 0
−ϕ3 −(β−1 − 1)
1 0
0 1

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Γ1 =

α 0 1 0
−ϕ2 β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1) −(ϕ3ρθ + ϕ4) −(β−1 − 1)ρψ
0 0 ρθ 0
0 0 0 ρψ

Since Γ0 is invertible, (1.79) can be written as
Yt+1 = Γ
∗
1Yt + Π
∗ηt+1 + Ψ∗εt+1
in which Γ∗1 = Γ
−1
0 Γ1, Π
∗ = Γ−10 Π and Ψ
∗ = Γ−10 Ψ. Applying a Jordan decomposition
on Γ∗1, the equation above becomes:
Yt+1 = PΛP
−1Yt + Π∗ηt+1 + Ψ∗εt+1 (1.80)
in which Λ is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of Γ∗1 on the main diagonal, i.e.
Λ =

α 0 0 0
0 β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1) 0 0
0 0 ρθ 0
0 0 0 ρψ

and P is a matrix composed of the right eigenvectors of Γ∗1, in which each column is
the eigenvector associated with the corresponding eigenvalue in Λ. It is well known
that the determinacy of bounded equilibrium of the linearized model hinges on the
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eigenvalues of Γ∗1, which are [α, β
−1 − γ(β−1 − 1), ρθ, ρψ]. In fact, the determinacy
solely hinges on (α, γ), the two parameters in the monetary and the fiscal policy
rules. When Γ∗1 does not have repeated eigenvalues, P has full column rank and
(1.80) can be written as
P−1Yt+1 = ΛP−1Yt + P−1Π∗ηt+1 + P−1Ψ∗εt+1 (1.81)
in which P−1 can be shown as
P−1 =

αϕ1+ϕ2
β−1−γ(β−1−1)−α 0
αϕ1+ϕ2
[β−1−γ(β−1−1)−α](α−ρθ) 0
− αϕ1+ϕ2
β−1−γ(β−1−1)−α 1 P
−1
2,3 − (β
−1−1)ρψ
β−1−γ(β−1−1)−ρψ
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

in which P−12,3 = − ϕ1[β
−1−γ(β−1−1)]+ϕ2
[β−1−γ(β−1−1)−α][β−1−γ(β−1−1)−ρθ] −
ϕ3ρθ+ϕ4
β−1−γ(β−1−1)−ρθ . When Γ
∗
1 has
repeated eigenvalues, as in the simple case I and II of section 3, P does not have
full column rank and generalized eigenvectors are obtained.
If the bounded equilibrium is determinate, the following conditions suppress the
unstable root of the dynamic system and hold for all t:
P i·Yt = 0 (1.82)
P i·Π∗ηt+1 + P i·Ψ∗εt+1 = 0 (1.83)
in which P i· is the ith row of P−1 and i is the index denoting the unstable eigenvalue
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in Λ. In this paper, i = 1 is corresponding to AM/PF and 2 is corresponding to
PM/AF. In both cases, ηt+1 is uniquely determined by (1.83). If the bounded
equilibrium is indeterminate, there is no unique mapping between ηt+1 and εt+1.
Appendix 1.A.2: Simultaneity Bias in the Simple Cases
• Case III (PM/AF): γ = ρθ = 0, 0 < α < 1, 0 < ρψ < 1
In this case, condition (1.82) is given by
a21pˆit + bˆt + a23θˆt + a24ψˆt = 0 (1.84)
in which aij is the ijth entry of P
−1. Since a21 6= 0, I substitute (1.84) into (1.75)
and get
(
ϕ1
a21
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
bˆt +
[
ϕ2
a21
+ β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
bˆt−1 =
(
ϕ3 − ϕ1a23
a21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
θˆt
+
(
β−1 − 1− ϕ1a24
a21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
ψˆt +
(
ϕ4 − ϕ2a23
a21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A5
θˆt−1 +
(
−ϕ2a24
a21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A6
ψˆt−1
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Since A1 6= 0, I have
bˆt =
A3 + A5L
(A1 + A2L)(1− ρθL)ε
θ
t +
A4 + A6L
(A1 + A2L)(1− ρψL)ε
ψ
t
=
A3
A1
+ A5
A1
L
(1 + A2
A1
L)(1− ρθL)
εθt +
A4
A1
+ A6
A1
L
(1 + A2
A1
L)(1− ρψL)
εψt
=
C3 + C5L
(1 + C2L)(1− ρθL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
εθt +
C4 + C6L
(1 + C2L)(1− ρψL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
εψt
in which Ci = Ai/A1, for i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
It can be shown that
B1 =
m1
1 + C2L
− n1
1− ρθL and B2 =
m2
1 + C2L
− n2
1− ρψL
in which
m1 =
C2C3 − C5
ρθ + C2
, m2 =
C2C4 − C6
ρψ + C2
, n1 = −C3ρθ + C5
ρθ + C2
, n2 = −C4ρψ + C6
ρψ + C2
So I have
bˆt−1 = B1εθt−1 +B2ε
ψ
t−1
= (m1 − n1)εθt−1 − (m1C2 + n1ρθ)εθt−2 + (m1C22 − n1ρ2θ)εθt−3 − · · ·
+(m2 − n2)εψt−1 − (m2C2 + n2ρψ)εψt−2 + (m2C22 − n2ρ2ψ)εψt−3 − · · ·
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Since
ψˆt =
εψt
1− ρψL = ε
ψ
t + ρψε
ψ
t−1 + ρ
2
ψε
ψ
t−2 + · · ·
I can show that
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt)
= (m2 − n2)ρψσ2ψ − (m2C2 + n2ρψ)ρ2ψσ2ψ + (m2C22 − n2ρ2ψ)ρ3ψσ2ψ − · · ·
= [(m2ρψ −m2C2ρ2ψ +m2C22ρ3ψ − · · · )− (n2ρψ + n2ρ3ψ + n2ρ5ψ + · · · )]σ2ψ
=
(
m2ρψ
1 + C2ρψ
− n2ρψ
1− ρ2ψ
)
σ2ψ
(1.85)
in which the last equality holds because when monetary policy is passive, C2 =
−αβ > −1 and |C2ρψ| < 1.
Finally, I can show that
var(bˆt−1)
= cov(bˆt−1, bˆt−1)
= [(m1 − n1)2 + (m1C2 + n1ρθ)2 + (m1C22 − n1ρ2θ)2 + · · · ]σ2θ
+[(m2 − n2)2 + (m2C2 + n2ρψ)2 + (m2C22 − n2ρ2ψ)2 + · · · ]σ2ψ
=
m21σ
2
θ +m
2
2σ
2
ψ
1− C22
+
n21σ
2
θ
1− ρ2θ
+
n22σ
2
ψ
1− ρ2ψ
− 2m1n1σ
2
θ
1 + C2ρθ
− 2m2n2σ
2
ψ
1 + C2ρψ
(1.86)
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• Case IV (AM/PF): α > 1, γ > 1, 0 < ρψ < 1
In this case, condition (1.82) and (1.83) simplify as
pˆit = − 1
α− ρθ θˆt (1.87)
ηt = − 1
α− ρθ ε
θ
t (1.88)
from which it is clear that fiscal shock has no effect on inflation. This is the standard
result of Ricardian equivalence, which is mentioned in the paper.
Since the DGP is characterized by AM/PF, the second row of (1.81), as defined
in Appendix 1.A.1, is a stable first-order difference equation, from which I can solve
for bˆt as a function of ε
θ
t and ε
ψ
t :
bˆt =
D3 +D5L
(D1 +D2L)(1− ρθL)ε
θ
t +
D4 +D6L
(D1 +D2L)(1− ρψL)ε
ψ
t
+
D7
D1 +D2L
εθt +
D8
D1 +D2L
εψt
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in which
D1 ≡ 1
D2 ≡ −λ
D3 ≡ −(a21g + a23)
D4 ≡ −a24
D5 ≡ λ(a21g + a23)
D6 ≡ λa24
D7 ≡
(
−ϕ1α + ϕ2
λ− α − ϕ1
)
g − ϕ3 + a23
D8 ≡ −(β−1 − 1)− (β
−1 − 1)ρψ
λ− ρψ
g ≡ −1/(α− ρθ)
λ ≡ β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1)
It can be shown that
D3 +D5L
(D1 +D2L)(1− ρθL) =
m1
1− λL −
n1
1− ρθL
= m1 + λm1L+ λ
2m1L
2 + · · ·
−n1 − ρθn1L− ρ2θn1L2 − · · ·
D4 +D6L
(D1 +D2L)(1− ρψL) =
m2
1− λL −
n2
1− ρψL
= m2 + λm2L+ λ
2m2L
2 + · · ·
−n2 − ρψn2L− ρ2ψn2L2 − · · ·
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in which
m1 =
D5 + λD3
λ− ρθ , m2 =
D6 + λD4
λ− ρψ , n1 =
D5 + ρθD3
λ− ρθ , n2 =
D6 + ρψD4
λ− ρψ
Besides,
D7
D1 +D2L
= D7 + λD7L+ λ
2D7L
2 + · · ·
D8
D1 +D2L
= D8 + λD8L+ λ
2D8L
2 + · · ·
With some algebraic derivation, I can show that
cov(bˆt−1, ψˆt) = −
ρψσ
2
ψ
[1− λρψ](1− ρ2ψ)
< 0
var(bˆt−1) =
[
(m1 +D7)
2
1− λ2 +
n21
1− ρ2θ
− 2n1(m1 +D7)
1− λρθ
]
σ2θ
+
[
(m2 +D8)
2
1− λ2 +
n22
1− ρ2ψ
− 2n2(m2 +D8)
1− λρψ
]
σ2ψ
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Appendix 1.B: The Model with Policy Inertia
To solve the model, I first combine (1.21), (1.69), (2.37) and (1.73). After rearrang-
ing terms, I get
ϕ1pˆit + bˆt + ϕ2pˆit−1 −
[
β−1 − ωγ(β−1 − 1)] bˆt−1 + (1− ω)(β−1 − 1)τˆt−1
+ϕ3θˆt + (β
−1 − 1)ψˆt + ϕ4θˆt−1 = 0 (1.89)
in which all the ϕ’s are defined as in Appendix 1.A.1. Next, I fit (1.21), (1.22),
(1.71), (1.76) and (1.89) into a dynamic system in terms of pˆit, bˆt, τˆt, θˆt, ψˆt and ε
ψ
t .
The linearized system is organized as
Γ0Yt+1 = Γ1Yt + Πηt+1 + Ψεt+1 (1.90)
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in which Yt+1 =
[
pˆit+1, bˆt+1, τˆt+1, θˆt+1, ψˆt+1, ε
ψ
t+1
]′
, εt+1 =
[
εθt+1, ε
ψ
t+1
]′
and
Γ0 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
ϕ1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

, Π =

1
0
0
0
0
0

, Ψ =

0 0
−ϕ3 −(β−1 − 1)(1− φ)
0 1− φ
1 0
0 1− φ
0 1

Γ1 =

α 0 0 1 0 0
−ϕ2 β−1 − ωγ(β−1 − 1) −(1− ω)(β−1 − 1) −(ϕ3ρθ + ϕ4) −(β−1 − 1)ρψ −(β−1 − 1)φ
0 ωγ 1− ω 0 ρψ φ
0 0 0 ρθ 0 0
0 0 0 0 ρψ φ
0 0 0 0 0 0

To solve the model, I apply a Jordan decomposition as in Appendix 1.A.1. The
matrix Λ is
Λ =

λ1 0 0 0 0 0
0 λ2 0 0 0 0
0 0 α 0 0 0
0 0 0 ρθ 0 0
0 0 0 0 ρψ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

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in which λ1 and λ2 are the two roots of the quadratic equation
βλ2 + (ωβ − β − 1 + ωγ − ωγβ)λ+ (1− ω) = 0 (1.91)
As in the benchmark DSGE model, determinacy of the bounded equilibrium solely
hinges on the policy parameters (α, γ). The determinacy regions as in Figure 1.2
are still valid here. The remaining steps of the solution procedure follow Appendix
1.A.1.
70
Appendix 1.C: Simultaneous Equations Approach
Appendix 1.C.1: Linearizing the IEC
First, I rewrite (1.42) as
wt = Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k
)[
st+j + (Rt+j−1 − 1) mt+j−1
pit+jµt+j
]
= Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k
)
st+j
+Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k
)
Rt+j−1mt+j−1
pit+jµt+j
−Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k
)
mt+j−1
pit+jµt+j
(1.92)
Let ∆t ≡
j∏
k=1
pit+kR
−1
t+k−1µt+k. Log linearizing (1.92) around the stationary steady
state and rearranging terms, I get
wˆt = Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
s
w
+
(R− 1)m
piµw
]
∆ˆt + Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[ τ
w
τˆt+j − g
w
gˆt+j
]
−Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
(R− 1)m
piµw
µˆt+j +
(R− 1)m
piµw
pˆit+j
]
+Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
Rm
piµw
Rˆt+j−1 +
(R− 1)m
piµw
mˆt+j−1
]
(1.93)
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in which β ≡ piµ/R is the inverse of the steady state growth-adjusted real interest
rate and ∆ˆt =
j∑
k=1
(pˆit+k + µˆt+k − Rˆt+k−1). Simplifying (1.93) further and expressing
variables in logarithm, I finally get
w˜t = k2 + Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
τ
w
τ˜t+j − g
w
g˜t+j +
(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
µ˜t+j
]
+ Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
[(
κ− (R− 1)m
piµw
)
p˜it+j −
(
κ− Rm
piµw
)
R˜t+j−1 +
(R− 1)m
piµw
m˜t+j−1
]
in which κ =
[
s
w
+ (R−1)m
piµw
] (
1
1−β
)
and
k2 ≡ ln (w)− β
1− β
[
κln(β) +
τ
w
ln(τ)− g
w
ln(g)− (R− 1)m
piµw
ln(µ)
]
+
β
1− β
[
(R− 1)m
piµw
ln(pi)− Rm
piµw
ln(R)− (R− 1)m
piµw
ln(m)
]
Appendix 1.C.2: Deriving (1.51)-(1.52)
First, I apply (1.50) in (1.45) and get
f¯tC¯w = k2 + Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
( τ
w
f¯t+jC¯τ − g
w
f¯t+jC¯g + κ1f¯t+jC¯µ + κ1f¯t+jC¯pi
)
−Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
(
κ2f¯t+j−1C¯R − κ3f¯t+j−1C¯m
)
(1.94)
in which κ1 = κ− (R−1)mpiµw , κ2 = κ− Rmpiµw , κ3 = (R−1)mpiµw .
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According to (1.49), I have
Etf¯t+j = f¯tB
j + B¯0
j−1∑
k=0
Bk (1.95)
Applying (1.95) in (1.94) and rearranging terms, I get
f¯tC¯w = k2 +
∞∑
j=1
βj
[(
f¯tB
j + B¯0
j−1∑
k=0
Bk
)( τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g + κ1C¯µ + κ1C¯pi
)]
−
∞∑
j=1
βj
[(
f¯tB
j + B¯0
j−1∑
k=0
Bk
)(
κ2βC¯R − κ3βC¯m
)]
−κ2βf¯tC¯R + κ3βf¯tC¯m (1.96)
Assuming the VAR(1) process (1.49) is stationary, it can be shown that
∞∑
j=1
βj
j−1∑
k=0
Bk =
β
1− β
∞∑
j=1
(βB)j−1 =
β
1− β (I− βB)
−1 (1.97)
Applying (1.97) in (1.96), I get
[
βf¯t(I− βB)−1B + β
1− β B¯0(I− βB)
−1
]
∗( τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g + κ1C¯µ + κ1C¯pi − κ2βC¯R + κ3βC¯m
)
+k2 = f¯t
(
κ2βC¯R − κ3βC¯m + C¯w
)
(1.98)
Collecting terms of (1.98) that are with f¯t and rearranging, I obtain the following
restriction on B.
βB
{ τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g + κ1C¯µ + κ1C¯pi + C¯w
}
=
(
κβ − m
w
)
C¯R − (R− 1)m
Rw
C¯m + C¯w
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Collecting terms of (1.98) that are without f¯t and rearranging, I obtain the following
restriction on B¯0.
k2 +
(
β
1− β
)
B¯0(I − βB)−1
( τ
w
C¯τ − g
w
C¯g + κ1C¯µ + κ1C¯pi
)
+
(
β
1− β
)
B¯0(I − βB)−1
[(m
w
− κβ
)
C¯R +
(R− 1)m
Rw
C¯m
]
= 0
Appendix 1.C.3: The FGLS Estimator
As shown in Chung and Leeper (2009) and Traum (2007), the part of the objective
function (1.57) that is related to b can be rewritten as −(b − bˆ)′S(b − bˆ), in which
bˆ = vec((X ′−1(X ′F )) and S ≡ (Σ−1 ⊗X ′X). Maximizing (1.57) subject to (1.60),
the first-order condition can be shown as b˜ = bˆ−S−1V ′ξ, in which ξ is the Lagrangian
multiplier of the constrained optimization problem. From the first-order condition,
I can derive ξ = (V S−1V ′−1(V b˜ − V bˆ). Substituting this expression for ξ back to
the first-order condition, I get
b˜ = bˆ+ S−1V ′−1V ′−1(vec(C¯0)− V bˆ)
in which I impose V b˜ = vec(C¯0).
Appendix 1.C.4: Constructing the Data Set
I use the quarterly U.S. data from 1947:2 to 2006:2 for the estimation. The data
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set is constructed by following Chung and Leeper (2009) and Traum (2007). If not
otherwise noted, the data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ NIPA tables.
All the quantity variables in levels are nominal values, which are divided by the GDP
deflator to form real values. For the VAR, I scale all the real quantity variables by
the real GDP.
• Yt: The nominal GDP that is seasonally adjusted at annual rates (line 1 in
NIPA Table 1.1.5).
• Pt: The GDP deflator for personal consumption expenditures that is seasonally
adjusted (line 2 in NIPA Table 1.1.4).
• yt: The real GDP, i.e. Yt/Pt.
• µt: The real GDP growth rate, i.e. yt/yt−1.
• pit: The GDP deflator inflation rate, i.e. Pt/Pt−1.
• Rt: The (annualized) three-month Treasury bill secondary market rate (Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistics & Historical
Data). Quarterly rates are constructed by converting the annualized rates
(monthly frequency) to quarterly rates (monthly frequency) and then taking
averages of the three quarterly rates (monthly frequency) within each quarter.
• Mt: The nominal St. Louis adjusted monetary base that is seasonally adjusted
(Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data-FRED, series
AMBSL). Quarterly data are constructed by taking averages of monthly data.
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• mt: The real monetary base, i.e. Mt/Pt.
• Tt: The nominal federal taxes that are defined as the sum of all current tax
receipts (line 2 in NIPA Table 3.2) and contributions for social insurance (line
11 in NIPA Table 3.2). The original data are seasonally adjusted at annual
rates.
• Gt: The nominal federal spending that is defined as the sum of federal con-
sumption expenditure (line 20 in NIPA Table 3.2), gross government invest-
ment (line 42 in NIPA Table 3.2) and net purchases of nonproduced assets
(line 44 in NIPA Table 3.2), minus consumption of fixed capital (line 45 in
NIPA Table 3.2). The original data are seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
• Zt: The nominal net transfers that are defined as the sum of net current
transfers, net capital transfers and subsidies (line 32 in NIPA Table 3.2), minus
income receipts on assets (line 12 in NIPA Table 3.2) and current surplus of
government enterprises (line 19 in NIPA Table 3.2). Net current transfers are
defined as current transfer payments (line 22 in NIPA Table 3.2) minus current
transfer receipts (line 16 in NIPA Table 3.2). Net capital transfers are defined
as capital transfer payments (line 43 in NIPA Table 3.2) minus capital transfer
receipts (line 39 in NIPA Table 3.2). The original data are seasonally adjusted
at annual rates.
• τt: The real net taxes, i.e. Tt/Pt − Zt/Pt.
• gt: The real federal spending, i.e. Gt/Pt.
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• Vt: The nominal federal debt that is constructed to obey the following gov-
ernment budget constraint
Vt − Vt−1 = Net Borrowing − Seigniorage
in which the nominal seigniorage is defined as Mt −Mt−1. The nominal net
borrowing is defined as Gt + INTt +Zt− Tt, where INTt is interest payments
(line 29 in NIPA Table 3.2). To construct the Vt series from 1947:2, I set the
value of 1947:1 debt according to the Cox and Hirschhorn (1983) data set31.
To guarantee the validity of the constructed debt series, I compare it with the
Cox-Hirschhorn series and they turn out to be consistent.
• wt: The real total government liabilities, i.e. Vt/Pt +Mt/Pt.
Appendix 1.C.5: Constructing Elasticities for the Identified
VAR
• The elasticity of net taxes/GDP to real GDP growth rate, i.e. ατµ:
Since τt/yt = tt/yt − zt/yt, applying log linearization around the stationary
steady state, I get
ατµ =
d(τ˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
=
t/y
τ/y
d(t˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
− z/y
τ/y
d(z˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
31The Cox-Hirschhorn debt series is available at http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.htm.
Following Chung and Leeper (2009) and Traum (2007), I choose not to use the Cox-Hirschhorn
debt series because the series is not consistent with NIPA’s definition of net borrowing.
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in which the steady-state ratios t/y, z/y and τ/y are calibrated as 0.0442,
0.0213 and 0.0229, respectively. It can also be shown that
d(t˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
=
dt˜t − dy˜t
dy˜t − dy˜t−1 =
dt˜t
dy˜t
− 1
d(z˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
=
dz˜t − dy˜t
dy˜t − dy˜t−1 =
dz˜t
dy˜t
− 1
in which dy˜t−1 = 0 because the information at time t−1 is taken as given. For
dt˜t/dy˜t and dz˜t/dy˜t, I take the values calibrated in Chung and Leeper (2009),
which are 3.15 and -0.15, respectively. Therefore, I calibrate ατµ to be 5.2146.
• The elasticity of net taxes/GDP to inflation rate, i.e. ατpi:
Similarly to the case of ατµ, I have
ατpi =
d(τ˜t/yt)
dp˜it
=
t/y
τ/y
d(t˜t/yt)
dp˜it
− z/y
τ/y
d(z˜t/yt)
dp˜it
Approximately, I have
d(t˜t/yt)
dp˜it
≈ dt˜t
dp˜it
d(z˜t/yt)
dp˜it
≈ dz˜t
dp˜it
For dt˜t/dp˜it and dz˜t/dp˜it, I take the values calibrated in Chung and Leeper
(2009), which are 1.64 and -1, respectively. Therefore, I calibrate ατpi to be
4.0917.
• The elasticity of net taxes/GDP to interest rate, i.e. ατR:
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Similarly as above, I have
ατR =
d(τ˜t/yt)
dR˜t
=
t/y
τ/y
d(t˜t/yt)
dR˜t
− z/y
τ/y
d(z˜t/yt)
dR˜t
Approximately, I have
d(t˜t/yt)
dR˜t
≈ dt˜t
dR˜t
d(z˜t/yt)
dR˜t
≈ dz˜t
dR˜t
Following Perotti (2004) and Chung and Leeper (2009), I calibrate both dt˜t/dR˜t
and dz˜t/dR˜t to be 0. Therefore, I calibrate ατR to be 0.
• The elasticity of government spending/GDP to real GDP growth rate, i.e. αgµ:
Obviously,
αgµ =
d(g˜t/yt)
d(y˜t/yt−1)
=
dg˜t − dy˜t
dy˜t − dy˜t−1 =
dg˜t
dy˜t
− 1
where dy˜t−1 = 0. Following Chung and Leeper (2009), I calibrate dg˜t/dy˜t to
be 0. Therefore, αgµ is calibrated to be -1.
• The elasticity of government spending/GDP to inflation rate, i.e. αgpi:
Approximately,
αgpi =
d(g˜t/yt)
dp˜it
≈ dg˜t
dp˜it
Following Chung and Leeper (2009), I calibrate αgpi to be -0.5.
• The elasticity of government spending/GDP to interest rate, i.e. αgR:
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Approximately,
αgR =
d(g˜t/yt)
dR˜t
≈ dg˜t
dR˜t
Following Perotti (2004) and Chung and Leeper (2009), I calibrate αgR to be
0.
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GMM Estimation θˆGMM t-stat p-value J-stat Prob(χ
2(q) >J-stat)
Case 1 (1952:1-2006:2) 0.0492 3.29 0.0010 4.6737 0.1973
Case 2 (1959:1-2005:4) 0.0674 4.06 0.0000 7.0770 0.1319
Case 3 (1960:1-2004:4) 0.0685 4.24 0.0000 10.5187 0.0618
Case 4 (1971:1-2001:4) 0.0763 3.51 0.0005 10.1615 0.1180
Table 1.1: Baseline GMM estimate of (1.4).
Note: Only the result of θˆGMM is reported. The default null hypothesis is H0 :
θ = 0. Prob(χ2(q) >J-stat) is the p-value associated with J-stat, which is the
J-statistic of Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions. Data are at quarterly
frequency. Time span for each case is listed in the first column. In case 1, z˜1t =
{1, τt−1, xt−1, pit−1, it−1, bt−1, PPIt−1, iLongt−1 , NAIRUt−1}. In case 2, z˜2t = {z˜1t ,M3t−1}.
In case 3, z˜3t = {z˜2t , iGermanyt−1 }. In case 4, z˜4t = {z˜3t , DEMUSDt−1}.
GMM Estimation θˆGMM t-stat p-value J-stat Prob(χ
2(q) >J-stat)
Case 1 (1952:1-2006:2) 0.0535 3.72 0.0002 12.5987 0.3204
Case 2 (1959:1-2005:4) 0.0558 4.73 0.0000 19.1550 0.1184
Case 3 (1960:1-2004:4) 0.0606 4.61 0.0000 19.9713 0.1730
Case 4 (1971:1-2001:4) 0.0521 5.49 0.0000 15.0227 0.5938
Table 1.2: GMM estimate of (1.4) with expanded set of instrumental variables.
GMM Estimation θˆGMM t-stat p-value J-stat Prob(χ
2(q) >J-stat)
Case 1 (1952-2006) 0.1814 3.96 0.0001 1.0771 0.7826
Case 2 (1959-2005) 0.3024 5.54 0.0000 5.6154 0.2298
Case 3 (1960-2004) 0.3038 6.16 0.0000 5.7817 0.3280
Case 4 (1971-2001) 0.3364 8.00 0.0000 4.1757 0.6529
Table 1.3: GMM estimate of (1.4) with annual data.
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Present-Value Component Net Taxes Shock Spending Shock
Net Taxes -4.3222 67.6013
[-2.1060,0.5656] [-4.4082,3.4065]
Spending 2.5547 -42.4831
[-0.6101,1.5057] [-2.5342,3.5157]
Primary Surplus -1.7674 25.1182
[-0.9204,0.1510] [-1.2943,1.0413]
Discount Rate 2.1825 -30.8156
[-0.1275,1.1199] [-1.1358,1.5332]
Seigniorage -0.4075 5.7412
[-0.1581,-0.0005] [-0.2581,0.1825]
Table 1.4: Present-value components of fiscal financing (baseline estimation).
Note: Median estimate of each component is provided along with 90% confidence in-
terval. The confidence intervals are estimated with the bias-adjusted bootstrap pro-
cedure proposed by Kilian (1998). Fiscal shocks are normalized to raise debt/GDP
from the steady state by 1%. The net taxes and spending components sum to the
primary surplus component. The primary surplus, discount rate and seigniorage
components sum to the 1% increase in debt/GDP.
Figure 1.1: U.S. Debt to GDP Ratio (1947-2006, Annually)
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Figure 1.2: First Quadrant of (α, γ) Space
Figure 1.3: Simultaneity Bias in Case III
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Figure 1.4: Simultaneity Bias (PM/AF)
Figure 1.5: Simultaneity Bias (AM/PF)
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Figure 1.6: Impulse responses of Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP to a positive
Surplus/GDP shock.
Note: VAR ordering, Surplus/GDP, Liabilities/GDP. Identification is based on
Cholesky decomposition. In the top panel, VAR is estimated with three lags and a
constant over the sample 1947:2-2006:2 using the U.S. quarterly data. In the bottom
panel, VAR is estimated with five lags and a constant over the sample 1947-2006 us-
ing the U.S. annual data. In all the plots, the black solid line represents the median
response. The blue solid line with circle represent the bounds of 68% confidence
interval. The red dashed line with asterisk represent the bounds of 90% confidence
interval. Confidence intervals are estimated with the bias-adjusted bootstrap pro-
cedure proposed by Kilian (1998).
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Figure 1.7: Impulse responses of surplus/GDP and liabilities/GDP from the baseline
estimation.
Note: Fiscal shocks are normalized to raise surplus/GDP from the steady state
by 1%. The left panel is following a surprise net taxes hike. The right panel
is following a surprise spending cut. The black solid line represents the median
response. The blue solid line with circle represent the bounds of 68% confidence
interval. The red dashed line with asterisk represent the bounds of 90% confidence
interval. The confidence intervals are estimated with the bias-adjusted bootstrap
procedure proposed by Kilian (1998).
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Chapter 2
On the Identification of Fiscal
Policy Behavior: A Bayesian
DSGE Approach
Abstract
The identification of fiscal policy behavior is a general equilibrium problem, which
requires that monetary policy behavior always be considered simultaneously. This
paper takes a holistic view and jointly identifies monetary and fiscal policy behav-
ior for the U.S. by estimating a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model with
Bayesian methods. By applying Bayesian model comparison techniques to the U.S.
Pre-Volcker and Post-1982 samples, this paper finds out that (1) both samples favor
determinacy over indeterminacy; (2) active fiscal policy is not detected in either
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sample. The findings are consistent with the previous literature for the Post-1982
sample, but not for the Pre-Volcker sample.
2.1 Introduction
It is a widely accepted notion that the nature of the equilibrium of the macro
economy hinges on the policy interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities.
Therefore, to identify fiscal policy behavior1 and learn the nature of the economy,
monetary policy should always be considered simultaneously. However, the empirical
literature conventionally treats monetary and fiscal policy as a dichotomy, i.e. only
one kind of policy behavior is studied and the other is usually ignored2. In recent
years, several people have pointed out that identifying fiscal policy behavior but
ignoring monetary policy tends to deliver unreliable inferences3. Woodford (1998)
suggests imposing more structures on the model and estimating monetary and fiscal
policies simultaneously.
To this end, this paper takes a holistic view and jointly identifies monetary and
1This paper only focuses on fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization. The other aspects
of fiscal policy behavior, such as fiscal authority’s stance on economic stabilization, are ignored for
simplicity.
2Typical methods to identify fiscal authority’s stance on debt stabilization but ignoring mon-
etary policy behavior include running Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on a fiscal policy
rule, e.g. Bohn (1998), running Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation on a fiscal
policy rule, e.g. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Claeys (2006, 2008), estimating a
bivariate fiscal Vector Autoregression (VAR), e.g. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001, 2002) and
Creel and Bihan (2006), and estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model,
e.g. Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010). Typical methods to identify monetary policy behavior but
ignoring fiscal policy behavior include running GMM estimation on a monetary policy rule, e.g.
Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), estimating a monetary VAR, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1998), and estimating a DSGE model, e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
3Typical examples include Cochrane (1998), Woodford (1998, 2001), Davig, Leeper and Chung
(2007) and Li (2010a), among others.
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fiscal policy behavior for the U.S. by estimating a standard New-Keynesian sticky-
price model with Bayesian methods. In the recently growing literature of estimated
new-Keynesian models, the U.S. monetary policy is usually estimated to be passive4
in the Pre-Volcker sample and active in the Post-1982 sample5. But fiscal policy is
usually trivialized by the assumption that lump-sum taxes/transfers adjust to clear
the government budget constraint each period. In another word, fiscal policy is
always assumed to be passive. Thus, the equilibrium of the Pre-Volcker sample in the
U.S. is generally inferred as being indeterminate and that of the Post-1982 sample is
inferred as determinate, as concluded in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). A potential
pitfall of this conclusion is that fiscal policy, which should be identified jointly with
monetary policy, is trivialized by assumption and active fiscal policy is ruled out a
priori. As a paper moving one step forward, Caivano (2007) allows for active fiscal
policy and estimates a small-scale new-Keynesian model similar to Woodford (1996)
with Bayesian methods. According to Caivano (2007), indeterminacy is a more
plausible interpretation of the U.S. Pre-Volcker sample than a non-Ricardian one,
which means that the U.S. fiscal policy in the Pre-Volcker sample was passive, which
is consistent with the widely held assumption. But Caivano (2007) does not provide
a formal test of indeterminacy as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). This paper
synthesizes the previous work by adopting Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)’s formal
4According to Leeper’s (1991) terminology, monetary policy is passive when the interest rate
responds to inflation at a value of less than one-for-one and active when the response is at a
value of more than one-for-one. Fiscal policy is passive when the tax responds to the outstanding
government debt strongly and active otherwise. According to Woodford’s (1995) terminology, an
equilibrium is called non-Ricardian when the monetary policy is passive and the fiscal policy is
active. Symmetrically, an equilibrium is called Ricardian when the monetary policy is active and
the fiscal policy is passive.
5According to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the Pre-Volcker sample refers to 1960:I to 1979:II
and the Post-1982 sample refers to 1982:IV to 1997:IV.
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test of indeterminacy and applying it to the estimated model that allows for active
fiscal policy. Taking different policy combinations as alternative data-generating
processes, I apply Bayesian model comparison techniques to draw inferences on the
policy regimes of the U.S. Pre-Volcker and Post-1982 samples. Since fiscal policy
behavior is identified by estimating the whole model with Bayesian methods, which
is a full-information approach, the simultaneity bias problem studied in Li (2010a)
is avoided a priori.
The main empirical finding of this paper is that both the Pre-Volcker and the Post-
1982 samples favor a data-generating process that is characterized by a combination
of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, which indicates determinacy. The
finding is consistent with the previous literature for the Post-1982 sample. For the
Pre-Volcker sample, the finding of this paper is at odds with Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) in that an active monetary policy is more favorable than a passive one. The
main finding implies that active fiscal policy is not detected in either sample.
2.2 The Model
For the empirical analysis, I use a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model sim-
ilar to Woodford (1996), Kim (2003), Davig and Leeper (2006) and Caivano (2007).
In the model, there is a utility-maximizing representative household and a contin-
uum of monopolistically competitive firms facing price stickiness that is governed by
Calvo (1983) pricing. The government sets fiscal policy according to a tax rule and
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the central bank sets monetary policy according to a Taylor-type nominal interest
rate rule. There are four types of structural shocks: technology shocks, monetary
policy shocks, government spending shocks and tax shocks. Even though the model
is presented in great details in the aforementioned papers, I briefly outline the nec-
essary model setup as follows for clarity of the paper.
2.2.1 Model Setup
The representative household chooses a composite consumption good (Ct), labor
input (Nt), nominal money balance (Mt) and one-period nominal government bond
(Bt) to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ + δ
(Mt/Pt)
1−κ
1− κ − χ
N1+νt
1 + ν
]
(2.1)
with 0 < β < 1, σ > 0, κ > 0, ν > 0, δ > 0 and χ > 0.
The composite consumption good (Ct) is produced by a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
aggregator:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
cjt
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
(2.2)
where cjt is demand for differentiated good j and θ > 1 is price elasticity of demand
for good j. From the household expenditure minimization problem, it can be shown
that
cjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Ct (2.3)
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where pjt is price of the differentiated good j and Pt is aggregate price index for the
composite consumption good that is defined as
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pjt
1−θdj
] 1
1−θ
(2.4)
The household budget constraint is
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+ τt ≤
(
Wt
Pt
)
Nt +
Mt−1
Pt
+
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+ Πt (2.5)
where τt is lump-sum taxes (if positive) or transfers (if negative), Wt is nominal
wage, Rt is nominal interest rate and Πt is profits from firms that is owned by the
household. The household problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.5), which
results in the following first-order necessary conditions
χ
Nνt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
(2.6)
R−1t = βEt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
(2.7)
Mt
Pt
= δ1/κ
(
it
1 + it
)−1/κ
Ct
σ/κ (2.8)
where it ≡ Rt − 1 is net nominal interest rate. Besides (2.6)-(2.8), the following
transversality condition must also hold all the time in equilibrium
lim
T→∞
Et
[
qt,T
AT
PT
]
= 0 (2.9)
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where At ≡ Bt + Mt is total nominal wealth and qt,t+1 ≡ (1/Rt)(Pt+1/Pt) is real
discount factor.
The government demands goods in the same way as the households do, which is
also based on a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:
Gt =
[∫ 1
0
gjt
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
(2.10)
where gjt, demand for differentiated good j, is
gjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Gt (2.11)
As one of the standard assumptions of New-Keynesian models, a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms produce differentiated goods using linear tech-
nology, which takes labor as input. The production function is
yjt = ZtNjt (2.12)
where Zt is aggregate technology that is common across firms. In this paper, Zt (in
logarithm) is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
log(Zt) = ρZ log(Zt−1) + Zt (2.13)
where ρZ ∈ [0, 1) and Zt is i.i.d.N(0, σ2Z). From (2.3) and (2.11), the aggregate
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demand curve faced by firm j is
yjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Yt (2.14)
where Yt = Ct+Gt is the aggregate resource constraint. Obviously, equating supply
and demand for individual goods implies that
ZtNjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Yt (2.15)
Assuming that labor services for individual firms convert into aggregate labor lin-
early, i.e. Nt =
∫ 1
0
Njtdj, (2.15) implies the aggregate production function as
Yt =
Zt
∆t
Nt (2.16)
where ∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
dj is a measure of relative price dispersion.
Following Calvo (1983), this paper introduces price stickiness by assuming that
a constant fraction 1 − ϑ firms are allowed to re-optimize their prices each period,
while the remaining firms are not allowed to adjust. The firms being able to re-
optimize their prices actually maximize the present value of their expected future
real profit streams, i.e.
max Et
∞∑
s=0
ϑsqt,t+sΠjt+s (2.17)
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where the real profit stream of firm j at period t is
Πjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)1−θ
Yt −Ψt
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Yt (2.18)
where Ψt, the real marginal cost, is defined in the individual firm’s cost minimization
problem as
Ψt =
Wt
ZtPt
(2.19)
The first-order condition of the individual firm’s optimal pricing problem implies
that
p∗jt
Pt
=
(
θ
θ − 1
) Et ∞∑
s=0
(ϑβ)s (Yt+s −Gt+s)−σ
(
Pt+s
Pt
)θ
Ψt+sYt+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ϑβ)s (Yt+s −Gt+s)−σ
(
Pt+s
Pt
)θ−1
Yt+s
(2.20)
where p∗jt is the optimal price chosen by firm j and
θ
θ−1 is the markup. Since all the
firms being able to re-optimize their prices face the same problem, they will choose
the same optimal price in equilibrium, i.e. symmetric monopolistic competitive
equilibrium. Therefore, the subscript j of p∗jt will be dropped hereinafter. From
(2.4), the aggregate price index evolves according to
Pt = [(1− ϑ)(p∗t )1−θ + ϑP 1−θt−1 ]
1
1−θ (2.21)
Accordingly, the inflation rate evolves according to
pit = [(1− ϑ)(pi∗t )1−θ + ϑpi1−θ]
1
1−θ (2.22)
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where pi∗t ≡ pt∗/Pt−1. For simplicity, the steady-state inflation rate, i.e. pi, is
assumed to be 1.
The government sets fiscal policy according to a tax rule, i.e.
τt = γ0 + γb
Bt−1
Pt−1
+ τψt (2.23)
where τ is the steady-state value of tax and ψt is an exogenous fiscal policy shock
following an AR(1) process
ψt = ρψψt−1 + 
ψ
t (2.24)
where ψt is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
ψ). Similarly, the central bank sets monetary policy according
to a Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule, i.e.
Rt = e
α0piαpit φt (2.25)
where φt is an exogenous monetary policy shock whose logarithm follows an AR(1)
process
log(φt) = ρφlog(φt−1) + 
φ
t (2.26)
where φt is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
φ).
The government budget constraint is
Gt = τt +
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
− Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
(2.27)
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In this paper, government spending (in logarithm) is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process
log(Gt) = (1− ρG)logG+ ρGlog(Gt−1) + Gt (2.28)
where G is the steady-state value of government spending and Gt , i.e. the govern-
ment spending shock, is i.i.d.N(0, σ2G).
2.2.2 The Linearized Model
The equilibrium conditions of the model are log-linearized around the steady state,
which are summarized in Appendix 2.A. The system of first-order difference equa-
tions can then be cast into the canonical form
Γ0Xt = Γ1Xt−1 + Πηt + Ψt (2.29)
where Xt =
[
pˆit, Rˆt, Yˆt, mˆt, bˆt, Zˆt, Gˆt, φˆt, ψt
]′
, ηt =
[
ηpit , η
Y
t
]′
and t =
[
Zt , 
G
t , 
φ
t , 
ψ
t
]′
.
Note, ηt is the vector of one-period-ahead endogenous forecasting error, e.g. η
pi
t ≡
pˆit − Et−1pˆit.
2.2.3 Determinacy Regions
It can be shown that the determinacy of bounded equilibrium of the linearized
system (2.29) hinges on (αpi, γb), i.e. the two parameters in the monetary and
fiscal policy rules. Following Leeper (1991), I characterize four different regions
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in the first quadrant of (αpi, γb) space
6, as shown in Figure 2.1: (1) When αpi ∈
(1,+∞) and γb ∈ (β−1 − 1, β−1), monetary policy is active (AM) and fiscal policy
is passive (PF). The resulting equilibrium is determinate; (2) When αpi ∈ (0, 1)
and γb ∈ (0, β−1 − 1), monetary policy is passive (PM) and fiscal policy is active
(AF). The resulting equilibrium is also determinate; (3) When αpi ∈ (0, 1) and
γb ∈ (β−1−1, β−1), monetary policy and fiscal policy are both passive. The resulting
bounded equilibrium is indeterminate; (4) When αpi ∈ (1,+∞) and γb ∈ (0, β−1−1),
monetary policy and fiscal policy are both active. Bounded equilibrium does not
exist. For the rest of the paper, I only focus on the regions in which bounded
equilibrium does exist, i.e. regions (1)-(3).
Figure 2.1: First Quadrant of (αpi, γb) Space
6As to the determinacy regions in the (αpi, γb) space, I only focus on those in the first quadrant
where both parameters are positive and the associated economic interpretation is meaningful.
Moreover, I restrict γb to (0, β
−1) so that β−1− γb, one of the eigenvalues of the system, is always
positive and oscillating dynamics is avoided.
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2.2.4 Model Solution
When the bounded equilibrium is determinate, I solve the model using the gensys
algorithm, which is based on Sims (2001). For the case of indeterminacy, the gensys
algorithm only provides one particular stable solution, which is not appropriate for
the empirical analysis. Therefore, I follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) to
compute the full set of stable solutions under indeterminacy. For implementation
in practice, I use a modified version of the gensys algorithm. For readers’ conve-
nience, I briefly sketch the methodology developed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
in Appendix 2.B.
In general form, the model solution can be expressed as
Xt = G(Θ)Xt−1 +K1(Θ)t +K2(Θ)ζt (2.30)
where Θ is the vector of structural parameters to be estimated and ζt is the sunspot
shock. Since the degree of indeterminacy is at most 1, I set the dimension of ζt as
1. Under determinacy, the last term of (2.30) drops out.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the estimation of the model using
Bayesian methods. Unlike the recent literature on identifying monetary policy be-
havior in estimated DSGE models, in which fiscal policy is usually trivialized and
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assumed to be passive a priori, e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), this paper treats
fiscal policy as equally important as monetary policy and tries to identify both kinds
of policy behavior jointly.
As in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), this paper will ultimately draw inferences
on the policy behavior using Bayesian model comparison techniques. Specifically,
I consider the following model specifications according to different combinations of
monetary and fiscal policy behavior: M1 (AM/PF, i.e. region 1 in Figure 2.1),M2
(PM/AF, i.e. region 2) and M3 (PM/PF, i.e. region 3).
2.3.1 Estimation Procedure
First, the model is cast into its state-space representation, in which (2.30) serves as
the state equation. The observation equation is
Qt = HXt (2.31)
where Qt =
[
Yˆ ot , pˆi
o
t , Rˆ
o
t , bˆ
o
t
]′
is the vector of observable variables and H is a selection
matrix mapping model variables into observable variables. Note, any observable
variable is with a superscript “o”. In this paper, both the observable variables and
the model variables are at quarterly frequency.
Based on Bayes’ theorem, the posterior density is defined as
p(Θ|QT1 ,Mi) =
L(Θ|QT1 ,Mi)p(Θ|Mi)
p(QT1 |Mi)
, for i = {1, 2, 3}. (2.32)
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where Θ = [αpi, γb, σ, κ, ν, ϑ, ρZ , ρG, ρφ, ρψ, σZ , σG, σφ, σψ] for M1 and M2. For M3,
Θ = [αpi, γb, σ, κ, ν, ϑ, ρZ , ρG, ρφ, ρψ, σZ , σG, σφ, σψ,M1, σζ ], where M1, appearing in
(2.45), is related to the indeterminacy of the propagation of fundamental shocks and
σζ is the standard deviation of sunspot shock. As in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
I normalize M2 in (2.45) to be 1. Q
T
1 denotes the whole set of observed data. L
denotes the likelihood function. p(Θ|Mi) and p(QT1 |Mi) are the prior density and
the marginal data density conditional on Mi, respectively.
Based on the state-space representation (2.30) and (2.31), the conditional like-
lihood L(Θ|QT1 ,Mi) is constructed and evaluated by Kalman filter, as derived in
Hamilton (1994). Then the posterior kernel, i.e. L(Θ|Y o,Mi)p(Θ|Mi), is simulated
for each model specification by random-walk Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm,
which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method commonly used
in the current literature of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. To initialize the
simulation for each model specification, I use Sims’ csminwel routine7 to search
for the posterior mode and the associated inverse Hessian at the mode in the cor-
responding region of the parameter space. Then I start the simulation from the
posterior mode, treating the inverse Hessian at the mode as the variance-covariance
matrix of the proposal density in the random-walk MH algorithm8. For a given
data set and conditional on each model specification, I run the random-walk MH
algorithm for 1 million iterations. Besides the trace plots, I check convergence of the
7The csminwel routine is not quite stable near the boundary or cliff in the parameter space. To
avoid the non-stability, I start the routine from several over-dispersed points and run the routine
in parallel. Then I choose the point with the largest posterior density as the approximated local
mode.
8Gelman et.al. (2004) and An and Schorfheide (2007) provide explanation of the simulation
method in more details.
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posterior draws using CODA package and Geweke’s Chi-squared test, according to
LeSage (1999) and Geweke (1999)9. Acceptance rate is kept between 30% and 40%
for different model specifications. After convergence to a stationary distribution is
confirmed, I discard the first 10% of the draws as burn-in phase and take every 30th
draw of the remaining chain to compute the posterior moments of the parameters.
To draw inferences on policy behavior, I implement Bayesian model comparison
and select the most favorable model based on Bayes factor10. As in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), An and Schorfheide (2007) and DYNARE (2005), I estimate
log marginal data density11, i.e. log p(Y o|Mi), with Geweke’s (1999) modified
harmonic-mean (MHM) estimator12.
2.3.2 Data
The model is estimated with quarterly U.S. data, which include four observable
variables: real GDP, inflation rate, nominal interest rate and real government debt.
To convert the data into percentage deviations from their steady state levels, I
detrend the logarithm of real GDP and real government debt with two independent
linear trends. The percentage deviation of inflation from its steady state is easily
calculated because its steady state is assumed to be 1. For nominal interest rate,
9Some other helpful references on convergence diagnostics are Kass (1998), Gilks et.al. (1996)
and Gelman et.al. (2004).
10Besides Bayes factor, there is another way to draw inferences on competing models, which is
to treat model indices as parameters. Simulation is then implemented in the expanded parameter
space. A popular example is the reversible jump MCMC algorithm. Justiniano (2004) extensively
surveys different strategies for model selection.
11The marginal data density intrinsically penalizes the likelihood function for models with free
parameters, such as M3.
12Lancaster (2004) also provides a good introduction to the issue of model comparison.
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the percentage deviation is calculated relative to its sample mean. Appendix 1.C.4
of Li (2010a) describes the construction of the data in more details.
To be comparable with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), I consider two sample peri-
ods for the estimation13: a Pre-Volcker sample from 1960:I to 1979:II and a Post-1982
sample from 1982:IV to 1997:IV.
2.3.3 Prior
Some model parameters are calibrated, as shown in Table 2.1. Specifically, β is
calibrated so that the (annualized) steady state real interest rate is 4%. The steady
states of the other ratios are their respective sample means.
For the vector of parameters to be estimated, the specified prior densities, means,
standard deviations and 90% probability intervals are reported in Table 2.2. It
is assumed that all the parameters are independent a priori, which is a common
assumption in the literature of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models14. When a
parameter is weakly identified, it is well known that prior may influence the poste-
rior significantly15. Therefore, this paper takes an agnostic approach on the prior
assumptions for the parameters. The monetary policy parameter αpi is centered at
1.1 and the 90% probability interval is from 0.43 to 2.03, which spans a quite large
13The Volcker-Greenspan sample from 1979:III to 1997:IV, which is also explored in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), is not considered in this paper because it has been widely recognized that the
monetary policy behavior during the Volcker-disinflation period, i.e 1979:III to 1982:III, cannot be
well described by a Taylor-type interest rate rule.
14This strong assumption is for simplicity. The generalization that parameters are treated as
potentially correlated is nontrivial, which is left for future research.
15Canova and Sala (2009) provides a detailed analysis on the issue of parameter identification
in DSGE models.
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interval and incorporates both active and passive policy behavior as possibilities.
The fiscal policy parameter γb is uniformly distributed
16 from 0 to β−1, which in-
corporates both active and passive policy behavior as possibilities and guarantees
that the dynamics is well-behaved. The preference parameters σ, κ and ν all follow
Gamma distribution with mean 2 and standard deviation 1. The probability that a
firm cannot re-optimize its price follows a Beta distribution. The prior mean 0.66
indicates that on average only one third of the firms are allowed to adjust their
prices each period. All of the autoregressive parameters of shock processes follow
Beta distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1. Their 90% intervals
indicate that the processes are relatively highly persistent. The standard devia-
tions of structural shocks all follow Inverse Gamma distribution with relatively high
dispersion. For the parameters characterizing indeterminacy of the propagation of
fundamental shocks, i.e. M1, uniform priors from -3 to 3 are assumed
17. For M3,
two cases are considered. First, there is no sunspot shock. So σζ is not identifiable.
Indeterminacy only comes from the propagation of fundamental shocks. Second,
there is sunspot shock. So both the fundamental shocks and the sunspot shock
contribute to the indeterminacy.
16Unlike the monetary policy parameter, the literature has not reached a consensus on the prior
for the fiscal policy parameter. For example, Caivano (2007) specifies a Beta prior for γb, while
Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) specifies a Gamma prior. This paper takes an extremely agnostic
approach.
17Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) treat M1 in a different way, assuming they are normally dis-
tributed with mean at a baseline indeterminacy solution. Specifically, for every parameter vector
Θ in the indeterminacy region, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) construct a corresponding parame-
ter vector Θ˜ on the boundary of the determinacy region. They then choose M∗1 for the baseline
indeterminacy solution by minimizing the discrepancy between the impulse responses conditional
on Θ and Θ˜. This methodology is not directly applicable to this paper because the model in this
paper has two possible determinacy regions. To determine which boundary to choose is nontrivial,
which is left for future research.
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2.3.4 Posterior Inferences
Table 2.3 and 2.4 report the log marginal data density and the Bayes factors con-
ditional on the two different samples. For M3, Ma3 and Mb3 denote indeterminacy
with and without sunspot shocks, respectively.
For the Pre-Volcker sample, M1 is the most favorable data-generating process
according to the Bayes factors, which is at odds with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
where indeterminacy under all different prior assumptions is always more favorable
than determinacy. In this paper, not onlyM1 but alsoM2, which is not considered
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), is more favorable than Ma3, where the latter is
corresponding to indeterminacy under Prior 1 in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
However, compared with Mb3 that is corresponding to indeterminacy under Prior 3
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), M2 is less favorable. For the Post-1982 sample,
M1 is again the most favorable data-generating process, which is consistent with
the conclusions in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The other findings for the Pre-
Volcker sample carry over to this period. In a word, the data-generating process
characterized by a combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy
is always preferred.
Table 2.5 reports the posterior means and 90% intervals for both sample periods.
Since M1 is always preferred regardless of the sample, posterior moments in Table
2.5 are all conditional on M1, i.e. the specification with an active monetary policy
and a passive fiscal policy. Compared with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the mag-
nitude of αpi and σ in this paper are much larger, which may be because a different
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data set is used. ρZ is almost 1, which implies that the technology process is very
likely to have a unit root18. According to σG and σψ, it is clear that the fiscal policy
shocks are more volatile than the technology shock and the monetary policy shock.
For readers’ reference, trace plots conditional on different model specifications for
both periods are displayed in Figure 2.2 to 2.919.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper jointly identifies monetary and fiscal policy behavior for the U.S. by
estimating a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model with Bayesian methods.
A conventional monetary DSGE model is generalized by allowing for active fiscal
policy behavior, which is usually ruled out a priori by the literature of estimated
DSGE models. By applying Bayesian model comparison techniques to the U.S.
Pre-Volcker and Post-1982 samples, this paper finds out that the combination of an
active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy, which indicates determinacy, is
always more favorable than the other policy combinations regardless of the sample.
This is consistent with the previous literature for the Post-1982 sample. For the
Pre-Volcker sample, this finding is at odds with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) in
that an active monetary policy is more favorable than a passive one. This finding
implies that active fiscal policy is not detected in either sample.
18The issue of unit root, which is not considered in this paper, is left for future work.
19A challenge lies in the estimation conditional on M2 (PM/AF), in which convergence of
MCMC is hard to be seen within 1 million draws. Since most of the estimated DSGE models
in the current literature assume fiscal policy as passive a priori, this technical challenge deserves
further exploration in the future work.
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Since the estimated model, data used and prior assumptions in this paper are more
or less different from those in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), plus there are some
technical challenges as already mentioned, e.g. convergence problem of MCMC for
PM/AF, the empirical findings of this paper need more investigation in the future.
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Appendix 2.A: The Linearized Model
Log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions of the model around the steady state
yields the following system of equations:
Yˆt = EtYˆt+1 +
(
1− g
σ
)[
−Rˆt + Etpˆit+1
]
+ g
[
Gˆt − EtGˆt+1
]
(2.33)
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 +
(1− ϑ)(1− ϑβ)
ϑ
(
σ
1− g + ν
)
Yˆt − (1− ϑ)(1− ϑβ)(1 + ν)
ϑ
Zˆt
−(1− ϑ)(1− ϑβ)
ϑ
(
σg
1− g
)
Gˆt (2.34)
mˆt =
1
κ
[
σ
(
1
1− g Yˆt −
g
1− g Gˆt
)
− β
1− β Rˆt
]
(2.35)
Rˆt = αpipˆit + φˆt (2.36)
(m
b
+ β−1
)
pˆit +
m
b
mˆt + bˆt = β
−1Rˆt−1 +
m
b
mˆt−1 +
(
β−1 − γb
)
bˆt−1
+
G
b
ρGGˆt−1 − τ
b
ρψψt−1 +
G
b
Gt −
τ
b
ψt (2.37)
Zˆt = ρZZˆt−1 + Zt (2.38)
Gˆt = ρGGˆt−1 + Gt (2.39)
φˆt = ρφφˆt−1 + 
φ
t (2.40)
ψt = ρψψt−1 + 
ψ
t (2.41)
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where variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values and xˆt denotes
log deviation of the generic variable xt from its steady-state value x, i.e. xˆt ≡
ln(xt)− ln(x). Note, g ≡ G/Y is the steady-state ratio of government spending to
output. Among the system of equations, (2.33) is the consumption Euler equation;
(2.34) is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve; (2.35) is the money demand equation;
(2.36) is the linearized monetary policy rule; (2.37) is the linearized government
budget constraint; (2.38)-(2.41) are the processes of the structural shocks.
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Appendix 2.B: Solution Under Indeterminacy
This appendix highlights the solution strategy under indeterminacy developed in
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), based on which I modify the gensys algorithm for
estimation.
Following Sims (2001), a generalized complex Schur (QZ) decomposition is ap-
plied to Γ0 and Γ1 of the canonical form (2.29), i.e. Q
′ΛZ ′ = Γ0, Q′ΩZ ′ = Γ1,
where QQ′ = Q′Q = ZZ ′ = Z ′Z = In×n and Λ and Ω are both upper triangular.
Premultiplying (2.29) by Q yields
 Λ11 Λ12
0 Λ22

 w1t
w2t
 =
 Ω11 Ω12
0 Ω22

 w1t−1
w2t−1
+
 Q1.
Q2.
 (Πηt + Ψt) (2.42)
where wt = Z
′Xt is an n×1 vector. As stated in Sims (2001), the system can always
be ordered and partitioned so that the m × 1 (0 ≤ m ≤ n) vector w2,t is purely
explosive. Therefore, the existence of stable solution requires that
Q2.Πηt +Q2.Ψt = 0 (2.43)
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Next, a singular value decomposition is applied to Q2.Π, i.e.
Q2.Π =
[
U.1 U.2
] D11 0
0 0

 V ′.1
V ′.2

= U︸︷︷︸
m×m
D︸︷︷︸
m×k
V ′︸︷︷︸
k×k
= U.1︸︷︷︸
m×r
D11︸︷︷︸
r×r
V ′.1︸︷︷︸
r×k
(2.44)
where D11 is a diagonal matrix and U and V are both orthonormal matrices. Note,
k is the dimension of ηt and r is the number of nonzero singular values of Q2.Π.
With all the information obtained so far, Proposition 1 of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) shows that if a solution to (2.43) exists so that the endogenous forecasting
errors ηt (k×1) can be expressed as a linear combination of the fundamental shocks
t (l × 1) and the sunspot shocks ζt (p× 1), it takes the following form
ηt =
(−V.1D−111 U ′.1Q2.Ψ + V.2M1) t + V.2M2ζt (2.45)
where V.2 is a k× (k − r) matrix, M1 is a (k− r)× l matrix and M2 is a (k− r)× p
matrix. When k = r, the solution is unique and the second and the third terms of
(2.45) drop out.
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Parameter β G/Y m/b τ/b G/b
Value 0.99 0.0838 0.2148 0.0754 0.0709
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameter Values for Estimation
Name Support Density Mean St. Dev. 90% Interval
αpi R+ Gamma 1.1 0.5 [0.43, 2.03]
γb (0, β
−1) Uniform 0.51 0.29 [0.10, 0.91]
σ R+ Gamma 2 1 [0.68, 3.88]
κ R+ Gamma 2 1 [0.68, 3.88]
ν R+ Gamma 2 1 [0.68, 3.88]
ϑ (0, 1) Beta 0.66 0.1 [0.49, 0.82]
ρZ (0, 1) Beta 0.7 0.1 [0.52, 0.85]
ρG (0, 1) Beta 0.7 0.1 [0.52, 0.85]
ρφ (0, 1) Beta 0.7 0.1 [0.52, 0.85]
ρψ (0, 1) Beta 0.7 0.1 [0.52, 0.85]
σZ R+ Inverse Gamma 1 1 [0.32, 2.45]
σG R+ Inverse Gamma 1 1 [0.32, 2.45]
σφ R+ Inverse Gamma 1 1 [0.32, 2.45]
σψ R+ Inverse Gamma 1 1 [0.32, 2.45]
σζ R+ Inverse Gamma 1 1 [0.32, 2.45]
MZ1 (−3, 3) Uniform 0 1.73 [-2.40, 2.40]
MG1 (−3, 3) Uniform 0 1.73 [-2.40, 2.40]
Mφ1 (−3, 3) Uniform 0 1.73 [-2.40, 2.40]
Mψ1 (−3, 3) Uniform 0 1.73 [-2.40, 2.40]
Table 2.2: Prior Distributions for Model Parameters
Specification ln p(QT1 |M) Bayes Factor versus M1
M1 (AM/PF) 992 1
M2 (PM/AF) 847 exp(145)
Ma3 (PM/PF) 776 exp(216)
Mb3 (PM/PF) 910 exp(82)
Table 2.3: Log Marginal Data Density Based on Pre-Volcker Period.
Note: Ma3: with a sunspot shock. Mb3: without sunspot shocks.
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Specification ln p(QT1 |M) Bayes Factor versus M1
M1 (AM/PF) 801 1
M2 (PM/AF) 695 exp(106)
Ma3 (PM/PF) 589 exp(212)
Mb3 (PM/PF) 746 exp(55)
Table 2.4: Log Marginal Data Density Based on Post-1982 Period.
Note: Ma3: with a sunspot shock. Mb3: without sunspot shocks.
Pre-Volcker Post-1982
Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
αpi 9.8808 [8.0204, 11.9338] 9.5957 [7.7116, 11.6743]
γb 0.0593 [0.0178, 0.1346] 0.0576 [0.0172, 0.1284]
σ 10.6365 [8.0612, 13.5995] 12.9399 [9.8266, 16.4602]
κ 9.1293 [6.8070, 11.8668] 8.2644 [6.0064, 10.9363]
ν 1.3192 [0.8932, 1.8003] 0.9145 [0.4764, 1.3189]
ϑ 0.8331 [0.7764, 0.8816] 0.7508 [0.6649, 0.8255]
ρZ 0.9944 [0.9904, 0.9972] 0.9924 [0.9853, 0.9967]
ρG 0.8634 [0.8218, 0.9003] 0.8474 [0.7911, 0.9005]
ρφ 0.8417 [0.7899, 0.8868] 0.7567 [0.6751, 0.8282]
ρψ 0.8901 [0.8234, 0.9455] 0.9091 [0.8570, 0.9524]
σZ 0.0617 [0.0488, 0.0770] 0.0558 [0.0441, 0.0700]
σG 0.1206 [0.0945, 0.1513] 0.1036 [0.0829, 0.1267]
σφ 0.0504 [0.0411, 0.0613] 0.0508 [0.0410, 0.0625]
σψ 0.2229 [0.1876, 0.2638] 0.1530 [0.1242, 0.1862]
Table 2.5: Parameter Estimation Results.
Note: Posterior inferences for both periods are conditional on M1 (AM/PF).
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Figure 2.2: Trace Plots for M1 (AM/PF) Conditional on Pre-Volcker Period
Figure 2.3: Trace Plots for M2 (PM/AF) Conditional on Pre-Volcker Period
114
Figure 2.4: Trace Plots forM3 (PM/PF) Conditional on Pre-Volcker Period, With
a Sunspot Shock.
Figure 2.5: Trace Plots for M3 (PM/PF) Conditional on Pre-Volcker Period, No
Sunspot Shocks.
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Figure 2.6: Trace Plots for M1 (AM/PF) Conditional on Post-1982 Period
Figure 2.7: Trace Plots for M2 (PM/AF) Conditional on Post-1982 Period
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Figure 2.8: Trace Plots forM3 (PM/PF) Conditional on Post-1982 Period, With a
Sunspot Shock
Figure 2.9: Trace Plots for M3 (PM/PF) Conditional on Post-1982 Period, No
Sunspot Shocks
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